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Monograph ~ IV

# Endowed but Cursed? Agrarian and Mining Accumulation in a Changing Environment

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## Abstract

European settler occupation of Zimbabwe began in 1890 and early economic planning was premised on large mining capital. When anticipated gold reserves were not found settlers turned to farming necessitating the appropriation of land from indigenous peoples for white settler agriculture. The direct confrontation and resistance against settler rule and expropriation of land occurred in early 1896/7, commonly referred to as the first Chimurenga (struggle) and the armed struggle (second Chimurenga) in the late 1960s. The first multi-racial election in 1980 brought into power a black majority government.

The first decade of post-colonial Zimbabwe was determined by the Lancaster House Agreement that ensured that the government adopted market-assisted rather than a radical land redistribution programme. Between 1980 and 1989 approximately 56,000 families were resettled on 2.6 million hectares of land. The second decade (1990-1999) of independence was characterised by slow redistribution of land, increased cost of living, and food riots by the urban population, high rates of unemployment and a drop in real incomes due to Economic Structural Adjustment Programme. Over the period 2000-2009, Zimbabwe experienced state sanctioned land-occupations and a sharp decline in its macro-economic performance. Discovery of alluvial diamonds in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 was a subject of intense contestation involving the state, mining communities, civil society, the diamond industry and donors. The continued rise in artisanal small-scale mining (ASM) in the post-Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) period is attributed to the declining economic performance. The FTLRP and indigenisation policy created a transformative context and space for black consciousness and empowerment in which the marginalised felt motivated to be part of economic processes.

The counter narrative argues that this redistributive programme, which sought to re-peasantise a formerly viable commercial farming sector, has brought an end to modernity and resulted in the abandonment of development resulting in Zimbabwe's macro-economic plunge. Using Gramscian concepts and metaphors of 'hegemony', 'war of maneuver', 'war of position,' 'organic' and 'traditional' intellectuals, this monograph seeks to unpack Zimbabwe's developmental pathway through the lens of political ecology with particular focus on its agrarian and mineral resource

economy. It aims to evoke discussions on a road map that allows the country to harness its resources towards inclusive growth and development.

## 1. Introduction

Zimbabwe attained independence in 1980 and 40 years on the country has seen significant social, political, institutional, and physical transformation. Zimbabwe is endowed with rich natural resources, namely agricultural land and high-value mineral deposits. At the turn of the 21st century the country's agrarian sector changed dramatically. The distribution of land across racial lines underwent rapid transformation through government-sanctioned confiscation and redistribution of land under the FTLRP. This radical redistribution shifted property ownership from about 6,000 white commercial farmers to over 150,000 black farmers under the A1 and A2 models and reversed the country's bifurcated agrarian structure by race (Moyo, 2011; Moyo and Chambati, 2013). The A1 model allocated small plots to landless peasant farmers while the A2 model allocated land to new black commercial farmers who had the skills and resources to farm and reinvest to raise agricultural productivity (Mkodzongi and Lawrence, 2019). Coincidentally, amid an economic crisis Zimbabwe's mineral sector was buoyed by the discovery of alluvial diamonds in Chiadzwa, Manicaland. This timely discovery was set to pull the country out of the economic downfall (Saunders and Nyamunda, 2016; Madimu, 2017; Saunders, 2018). Zimbabwe was on the road to 'Eldorado' with land in the hands of the majority and a resurgence of exploration and investment by international companies in mining including progressive policy and legislation toward indigenous economic empowerment for a more inclusive mineral sector. Yet, 40 years on despite mineral endowment and land to the majority – the country's twin drivers of economic activities – capital has not spread its wings and uneven development is more pervasive in space, time and society. For example, the Zimbabwe Poverty Report (ZIMSTAT, 2019) revealed that more than seven in ten people in Zimbabwe were poor and extreme poverty had increased to 29.3% in 2017.

This monograph seeks to unpack Zimbabwe's post-independence developmental pathways through a political economy approach with focus on the country's agrarian and mineral economy. It discusses the different cycles of political economy and how these have shaped and impacted nature-society relationship and in turn the uneven development, since independence. History and context are important for understanding

the complex nature of Zimbabwe's land question, the political-economic landscape which led to the FTLRP, agricultural performance, and the mineral economy. As such, key benchmarks from the history of settler colonisation are briefly outlined, followed by post-independence experiences using Gramscian concepts and metaphors of 'hegemony,' 'war of maneuver,' 'war of position,' 'organic' and 'traditional' intellectuals as the lens through which to understand and analyse Zimbabwe's land alienation process, agrarian reform and the mineral economy. A consideration of Gramscian metaphors provides a useful framework for illustrating how certain groups in society have the power to name reality, to describe and categorise the world, and stabilise certain truths and worldviews (Chigumira, 2014). In addition, it contributes to 'understanding the production of nature and how subaltern classes contest the remaking of nature in their struggle to build livelihoods' (Karriem, 2009: 318).

## 2. The Long Walk to Freedom

### *2.1 Colonial land appropriation*

According to Phimister, (1976) the European settler occupation of Zimbabwe began in 1890 under the auspices of the British South Africa Company (BSAC). The foundations of colonisation of Southern Rhodesia and early economic planning were premised on large mining capital. The primary interest of the BSAC and the pioneer settlers was gold (Palmer, 1997), as it was envisaged that the country, like the Witwatersrand in South Africa, had abundant gold reserves – a source of wealth that could be exploited (Lebert, 2003). While hopes for the second Rand were high, the reality was to the contrary (Van Onselen, 1976). By 1895, the anticipated gold reserves were not found and the BSAC then encouraged settlers to turn to farming (Leys 1959; Tindell, 1967; Bowman, 1973). This policy shift necessitated the appropriation of land for white settler agriculture by removing indigenous peoples from their land and placing them into native reserves (Lebert, 2003). The shift in policy consequently introduced the 'native question' and the principle of land segregation by race, which successive settler governments followed. The 'native question' entailed the 'definition and fashioning of the relationship between white settlers and indigenous people and the consequent problem of the equality and inequality of races within a colonial society' (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2009:61). Put in another way, the 'native question' addressed how to rule and exploit

the native in a way that advanced the economic growth of the colony, and preserved settler interests and dominance.

The settler governments resorted to what Mahmood Mamdani (1996) termed the 'bifurcation of the colonial state,' which involved the articulation and institutionalisation of race and racial differences within the colonial state, creating a class of 'citizens' (white settlers) and 'subjects' (black natives). Africans were excluded from civil liberties and freedom (direct rule) and confined to what was considered subordinate African customary canon (indirect rule). Further, legal measures like the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 – which is considered as the 'magna carta' of racial and spatial segregation – entrenched a racially dichotomised state. This Act and its subsequent amendments legally instituted the spatial segregation of land by race in both urban and rural localities and allowed whites to consolidate their dominance and power. Mlambo (2010:57) called this the 'entrenchment of settler caste society … with whites as a permanent aristocracy'.

### 2.2 The liberation struggle

The dualistic economy, in particular, the spatial segregation of land became the root of the black discontentment that eventually led to the demise of settler colonial rule and hegemony. Africans, who had become, in Gramscian terms, the subaltern group, did not passively accept their subjugation and the spatial arrangement created by settler rule. The first direct confrontation and resistance against settler rule and expropriation of land – a 'war of maneuver'– came through two separate uprisings in early 1896/7, by the two major native tribes in the country, the Shona (led by Mbuya Nehanda and Sekuru Kaguvi) and the Ndebele (led by Lobengula) people (Samupindi, 1990). However, this early form of counter-hegemony commonly referred to as the first *Chimurenga* (struggle) was curbed by the military prowess of the settlers. Raftopoulos (2008) attributes the defeat to the failure of the Ndebele and Shona people to set a common front against colonial rule. Despite this defeat, the displacement of Africans from their lands was to remain a source of grievance fueling organised anti-colonial resistance decades later (Mlambo, 2010). Colonial legislation continued to alienate black-white relations. For instance, the Native Land Husbandry Act, which Beinart (1984: 269) depicts as an environmental management policy that celebrated western knowledge and pronounced Africans as environmentally reckless, fuelled the expansion of mass nationalism in the

second half of the 1950s (Phimister, 1993). In the same period the Southern Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC), National Democratic Party (NDP) and Benjamin Burombo's African Voice Association (AVA) were critical of the Native Land Husbandry Act and other restrictive legislation.

It is important to note that the African response during the colonial era was not limited to resistance. Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2009:68) puts forward that 'African responses to early colonisation was a mixture of complicity, resistance … negotiations and alienations'. Owing to the social differentiation of the African populace, with the African 'elite tending to be narrow and "socially specific" in the pursuit of policies that would improve their lot'. The colonial government capitalised on this social differentiation, through divide and rule tactics, to maintain its hegemony. For Gramsci, implicit in hegemony is the need to build alliances with social forces as well as through the hegemonic class incorporating some of the interests of the subordinate classes (Karriem, 2009). As such, the colonial government, in an attempt to form an 'alliance' with the educated middle-class group of black doctors, lawyers, nurses, journalists and social workers, demarcated areas from which approximately 10,000 middle-class Africans could purchase land and hold title, called the Native Purchase Areas (Shutt, 1997). This group of middle-class individuals, whom Mlambo (2009) described as determined to attain a certain level of 'western standards of respectability', participated in multiracial experiments with various liberal white organisations in the 1950s. This multiracial 'partnership' provided the black bourgeoisie class limited space within the political economy. Furthermore, the colonial government aligned itself with African traditional institutions such as the chiefs by incorporating them into the state administration and providing them with a state salary.

Despite the land concessions and multiracial 'participation' in the political economy, a growing sense of disillusionment with the colonial system's 'unwillingness to extend (full) benefits of political, social and economic participation to the educated black middle-class gave birth to militant nationalism that then demanded self-government or "one man one vote"' (Mlambo, 2009:85). This militant nationalism found its ally in the disgruntled peasantry. For the colonial state, agricultural policies such as the Land Husbandry Act, and measures such as the Cattle Levy Act and Maize Control Acts, that subsidised settler farming at the African farmer's expense, stoked peasant farmer grievances (Phimister, 1988). This was

further exacerbated by the overcrowded and overgrazed conditions in the native areas, and continued appropriation of land and mineral rights by the settlers. Gramsci contends that for a 'war of position' to be successful, 'a counter-hegemonic force will have to move beyond its own class or corporatist interest and take into account national popular demand' (Karriem, 2009:318).

The nationalists capitalised on the negative impact of colonial legislation through utilising and channelling the discontent to challenge the Southern Rhodesian political system. Moore (1993: 383) points out that 'symbolic meanings can…play an important role in struggles over resources as well as over competing cultural underpinnings of rights, property relations and entitlements'. The 1896/7 uprising became symbolic and was drawn upon as part of a nationalist imagination in the independence struggle (second *Chimurenga)*, and later in the land occupation movement that culminated in the FTLRP (third *Chimurenga*), in addition to the motif for indigenous economic empowerment to redress colonially induced injustices and racial imbalances in the ownership of the means of production. As such, the educated black middle class, who had aspired to be incorporated into the colonial system as equals, turned their backs on 'white paternalism' and allied with the peasants to demand independence from colonial rule (Mtisi et al., 2009). However, this is not to say that peasants lacked agency and allowed the middle class to monopolise the concept of nationalism, for in fact they redefined issues of local concern within the nationalist framework, thereby directing nationalist discourse to focus on reclamation of the 'lost lands' and the replacement of a 'bad state' with a 'good state' run by the African majority (Alexander et al., 2000).

According to national historiography the desire to repossess expropriated land served as a key motif for the African nationalists to pursue an armed struggle against the colonial government. The turn to an armed struggle (second *Chimurenga*) in the late 1960s – against a modern army of the white regime–was a struggle for the land. This 'war of maneuver' against the settler government involved the nationalist leaders drawing on discourses of race, citizenship and origin in constructing the idea of the desired nation (Raftopolous and Mlambo, 2009; Mtisi et al., 2009). These ideas were communicated in phrases and songs that had emotional overtones which tied the African to the land, such as '*mwana wevhu'* (child of the soil) and '*ivhu kuvaridzi varo*' (land to its rightful

owners), which easily resonated with the feelings of anger and resentment that the populace in the countryside had toward the dispossession of their lands. According to Lebert (2003), the peasantry was conscientised on the imagined community/nation through evening '*pungwe'* (evening meetings/rallies) during which narrations of the course of the war were recounted and liberation songs with strong racial nuance, as well as calls for freedom, were sung. These *pungwe* also served as a platform to recruit young cadres to join the struggle. The same method was later utilised by leaders of the land occupation movement in 2000.

By the late 1970s the protracted war had reached a stalemate with all sides incurring considerable human loss and increased financial cost (Mhanda, 2011). In addition, the allies from front-line states in Africa, had grown weary of the war and, together with Britain and the United States forced the parties to negotiate a ceasefire (Mhanda, 2011). In 1979, these parties met at Lancaster House in the United Kingdom where a peace settlement was negotiated under the facilitation of Lord Carrington. The key tenets of the settlement – entrenched in the Lancaster House Constitution were on land and voting rights. The white community retained 20 of the 100 seats in parliament and white-owned land could only be acquired through the principle of 'willing buyer willing seller, for ten years after independence.'

This Lancaster House settlement restricted the redistribution of white-owned land by forcing the post-colonial government to purchase farms on the market. Although the nationalist leaders initially resisted the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause, the promise by Britain, in particular, to finance the land resettlement programme resulted in these leaders acceding to a negotiated Constitution despite its flaws (Sadomba, 2008). Mlambo (2009) describes the Lancaster Constitution as one in which 'Africans (were) offered the driver's seat while whites would continue to map the route they must take and control the fuel it ran'. This Lancaster House settlement was the basis for contest in the post-colonial era, in particular after the expiry of the Lancaster House Constitution and the willing buyer willing seller clause in 1990. Despite the country attaining black majority rule, the policy of reconciliation under the Lancaster House Constitution preserved white-settler agricultural lands and economic superiority (Sadomba, 2008). In addition, mining rights and capital remained in the hands of international capital (Mawowa, 2013).

## 3. The Promised Land, Governance and Disillusionment

### *3.1 The promised land – 1980-1989*

The first multi-racial election in 1980 brought into power a black government. On the 18 April 1980 Zimbabwe was recognised as an independent state by Britain, officially marking the end of colonial rule in Zimbabwe. The nationalist processes of imagining a 'nation-state' came to fruition, although fraught by racial imbalances. Colonial capitalism by its very nature had perpetuated 'uneven development' across race and geography and mostly visible in the apportionment of land wherein

> white 'agrarian bourgeoisie', some 6000 farmers, retained 39% of the land, some 15.5 million hectares of prime agro-ecological farmland, while one million black households remained consigned to 41.4% of the land, 16.4 million hectares of marginal land. (Moyo & Yeros, 2005:171)

The first decade of post-colonial Zimbabwe was characterised by nation building. The post-colonial government's policy priority – 'growth with equity' influenced by socialist ideals, aimed at achieving social justice, reducing the social and economic gaps between blacks and whites, through the redistribution of land and a shift in agricultural extension to support black farmers (McCandless, 2000; Hanlon et al., 2012). It is important to note that Zimbabwe acquired independence in a post-development era dominated by neoliberal thinking, which favoured the capitalist mode of production and marketing (Bernstein, 2003). This neoliberal framework, instituted through the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause in the Lancaster House Constitution, forced the government to adopt a market-assisted rather than a radical land redistribution programme. Further, this framework, under the guise of a policy of national reconciliation, prevented a radical redistribution of land, and maintained the status quo of white-owned large-scale commercial farming (Ranger, 1985; Palmer, 1990). Reconciliation aimed to prevent the exodus of skilled white commercial farmers and preserve the country's food self-sufficiency, since 90% of the food requirement came from this group. Peasant production had decreased significantly due to out-migration as people escaped the war, and three quarters of this population had been imprisoned in protected villages (Palmer, 1990).

The new government, despite the constraints imposed by the Lancaster House Constitution, embarked immediately on land redistribution under

the Land Reform and Resettlement Programme (LRRP) Phase I. This phase had two tenets, 1) the Normal Intensive Resettlement Programme in which land recipients were systematically resettled according to planned settlements schemes; and 2) the Accelerated Land Resettlement Programme which responded to peasant occupations of white-owned commercial farms immediately after independence (Waeterloos & Rutherford, 2004). According to Moyo et al. (2004) these peasant occupations differed from those that came later under the FTLRP in that they took place on uncontested land abandoned by white farmers during the war. Because of the 'willing buyer willing seller' clause, the land offered to the government on the market was mostly in marginal agro-ecological regions III, IV and V and, as such, 81% of the resettlement schemes from this phase are located in these drier regions (Masiiwa, 2004).

**Figure 1: Land divisions at independence according to the natural farming regions**




*Source: Fox, Chigumira & Rowntree (2007)*

Between 1980 and 1989 approximately 56,000 families were resettled on 2.6 million hectares of land (Palmer, 1990; Moyo, 1995). This phase of the LRRP has been extensively documented in the literature with most

scholars (Moyo, 1995, 2000, 2003; Drinkwater, 1989; Kinsey, 1999, 2004; Dekker & Kinsey, 2011) considering it to have been successful in settling a moderate number of African households on former commercial farms, and with an outcome that shows an improvement in the livelihoods of land recipients. Production gains by resettled households were attributed to the major agricultural support from government extension services, access to credit and finance, as well as adherence to appropriate conservation measures (Moyo, 2003).

In relation to mining, the 1980s continued to be characterised by the dominance of international capital and large-scale mining led by mining conglomerates such as Rio Tinto, Lonrho and Anglo-American. wGold output continued to be the country's main mineral due to government's support. For example, in 1984 the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ), introduced a gold stabilisation scheme to protect miners against effects of price volatility. Mawowa (2013) states that although small-scale gold and chrome mining was viewed as important for promoting the entry of black players; it was not until the 1990s that a massive entrance of black players came to the fore.

In relation to the political economy, this first decade of independence saw the government adopting and pronouncing a Marxist-Leninist system of governance based on socialist ideology. This was mainly because the liberation struggle had been heavily supported by socialist and communist countries including China and Russia. The ideology advocated for a single party state and hence the call for a one-party state in the country during this decade.

### *3.2 Disillusionment and ESAP: 1990-1999*

For two decades Zimbabwe had become a *de facto* one-party state due to ZANU-PF's political hegemony as well as weak and fragmented opposition parties. However, by the end of the second decade of independence, a counter-hegemonic force based on a coalition of civil society, white commercial farmers and a new opposition party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), challenged the ruling party, and contributed to the land occupation movement and implementation of the FTLRP.

The growth of this counter-hegemonic force stemmed from the economic decline precipitated by the adoption of the neoliberal Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in the early 1990s. Zimbabwe had attained independence in the post-developmental era where neoliberal

thinking dominated the developmental agenda. Accordingly, the premise of economic growth to improve rural and urban livelihoods depended on a fully liberalised economy through structural adjustments. Hence, the second decade of independence saw government adopting ESAP, which had an adverse effect on land redistribution and the macro-economy (Kanyenze, 2004).

The second decade of independence was characterised by slow redistribution of land, increased cost of living, and food riots by the urban population, high rates of unemployment and a drop in real incomes due to ESAP (Marquette, 1997; Kanyenze, 2004). Between 1995 and 2000 the country experienced over 500 trade union-led strikes in sixteen different sectors of the economy and agitation for rights by civil society groups (Kanyenze 2004). According to Moyo (2011) Zimbabweans' demand for arable land was a response to the political consequences of this poor economic environment, rising unemployment and a decline in wages. The war veterans among others, were disgruntled by the slow pace of land redistribution, and the fact that government had not made significant advancement in narrowing the gaps between the racial groups established in the colonial era except for the upper stratum of the population (Moore, 2010).

The significant decline in the macro-economy, which contributed to de-industrialisation, resulted in the movement of labour from the formal to informal sectors in search of alternative livelihoods (Chigumira, 2018). Consequently, gold panning and ASM in mineral-rich regions increased phenomenally and became a refuge for the economic problems faced by the country (Shoko and Veiga, 2004). The government then placed ASM as part of the solution to poverty alleviation and the unemployment situation in the country and placed new regulations that allowed Rural District Councils (RDC) to license artisanal miners (Spiegel, 2009). In addition, the Fidelity Printers, the gold-buying agency for the RBZ allowed for artisanal miners to deliver small quantities of gold and offered higher prices (Mawowa, 2013). Chigumira (2018) posits that the shift in ASM policy aimed to curb civil unrest posed by increased unemployment and economic hardships, because the cyclical linkages of support and cooperation between urban and rural households involving cash remittances had significantly declined.

While government had become inclusive toward small-scale miners there was still disaffection by certain sectors of the population with the

Lancaster House Constitution, which symbolised the continued dominance of British imperialism and international capital (Sadomba, 2008). As such, various political and civic groups, including the war veterans, began to advocate for a homegrown Constitution to which government acquiesced. However, the process of re-writing the new Constitution set in motion two sets of bipartisan alliances: that between the war veterans and government; and between civil society and academics from the country's universities as well as the white commercial farmers – an event that culminated in the implementation of FTLRP (Fox et al., 2006). From a Gramscian perspective, the traditional intellectuals in the ruling party played a key role in rewriting the Constitution which, among other measures, allowed for the compulsory acquisition of land and was seen as favorable to the ruling party' political domination and increased the presidential powers. Disenchantment with the state-controlled constitution-making process led to a counter process by civil society and its alliances, in particular the landed-whites who up to then had enjoyed the socio-economic preserve granted to it since Independence (Chigumira, 2014) under the umbrella of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA). The latter advocated for a people-driven constitution-making process. Kanyenze (2004) maintains that most members of the opposition MDC, formed in 1999, came from the NCA.

In February 2000, the government-sponsored Constitution was put to a referendum and was rejected by the populace. Whites, who in the past two decades of independence had not involved themselves in Zimbabwe's electoral process, took a 'war of position' to protect their landed interests, and mobilised their workers to vote against the Constitution and also aligned themselves with civic groups, trade unions and the MDC in this endeavor. The overwhelming 'No' vote at the referendum was ZANU-PFs first electoral defeat, only a month before the general elections.

## 4. The Decade of Crisis: 2000-2009

### *4.1 Radical change through conscientisation and land occupations*

The argument advanced in this section follows the reasoning that nations, communities and individuals may have to reach a certain level of consciousness before they can perceive their space differently and be called to make decisions and participation in government initiatives. This ushers in conscientisation's major strength as a notion of analysis as it brings into

focus other important concepts like social identity, power relationships and identity construction, which may be important in shaping a collective mentality. According to (Freire 1970:19) conscientisation is a process of 'learning to perceive social, political, and economic contradictions, developing a critical awareness so that individuals can take action against the oppressive elements of reality'. This approach is an affirmation of Soja's, (1985: 90) argument that 'spatiality situates social life in an active arena where purposeful human agency jostles problematically with tangential social determinations to shape everyday activity, particularise social change, and etch into place the course of time and the making of history'. The concept of emancipative beliefs is adopted and placed in the political and social arena in which different stakeholders jostle for equitable space to meet their development, empowerment and even their hidden political agendas.

Politically, the rejection of the government-sponsored Constitution in February 2000 marked the turning point in Zimbabwe's formerly orderly agrarian and resettlement programme of the 1980s and 1990s, and the dominance of ZANU-PF in national politics. Zimbabwean politics after the referendum 'witnessed a range of political and economic convulsions in which new social relations emerged…and the state was reconfigured in a more authoritarian way …' (Raftopoulos & Mlambo 2009: xxiv). First, realising the possibility of electoral defeat at the general elections in March, Mugabe invoked presidential powers and postponed the general elections to June 2000. Second, during this period the 'organic intellectuals' in the War Veterans Association mobilised rural peasants, youths and unemployed urbanites to occupy white-owned farms across the country. The rejection of the government-sponsored Constitution signified to this group the continued domination of white landed capital, and prevention of compulsory acquisition of white-owned large-scale commercial farms for land redistribution. The Mugabe-led government felt betrayed by the white commercial farmers whom they felt had been 'graciously" incorporated into Zimbabwe after independence through a policy of national reconciliation. Mugabe blamed white intransigence over land reform, which was signified by the rejection of the Constitution, for the land occupations. He stated (in referring to the government's defeat at the referendum):

> …their mobilizing (white commercial farmers), actually coercing, their labor force on the farms to support the one

> position opposed to government, has exposed them as not our friends but enemies…our present state of mind is that you are now our enemies because you really have behaved as enemies of Zimbabwe, we are full of anger. Our entire country is angry and that is why we now have the war veterans seizing land. (Meredith, 2002:175)

According to Meredith (2002:169), in reference to the land occupations, a senior ZANU-PF official and government minister, Didymus Mutasa, asserted that 'the whites have themselves to blame because they shot themselves in the foot by mobilizing people to throw away the draft Constitution … they are now reaping the fruits of their action'.

From a Gramscian perspective the 'organic intellectuals' reshaped the ruling party's political discourse and repositioned ZANU-PF as the party that would liquidate the legacy of colonialism and racism through the land occupation movement (Moore, 2010). Such conscientising required discourse that allowed for the 'othering' of those who had rejected the draft Constitution of 2000. The ruling party revived nationalist and anti-colonial discourse centrally located on the themes of land, race, and patriotic history. Willems (2004) writes that the state effectively employed the state-run media to represent and construct the events in Zimbabwe, which further created a polarised environment. Discourse of nationhood and sovereignty through 'othering' categories and/or dichotomies of 'us' (the ruling party) and 'them' (those critical of the state), and insiders versus outsiders was run on state-owned media. Table 1 (opposite) provides a summary of the binaries used in the ruling party's discourse in the reconstruction of the Zimbabwean nationhood.

Thus the discourse advanced by the ruling party during the decade centered on the racialisation of land, where race was used to justify the campaign to drive white commercial farmers off their land, with the assertion of the 'restoration of the lost lands'. The land occupations were then justified in the name of 'righting colonial wrongs and repossessing land stolen from Africans by colonial settlers' (Mlambo, 2010:63) and maintaining the nation's sovereignty. The sense of loss of Zimbabwe's sovereignty was heightened by the fact the white commercial farmers, 'kith and kin' of the West, had successfully mobilised international support to condemn these large-scale displacements from their lands, and pressure the Zimbabwe government to adhere to the rule of law and maintenance of

property rights.

**Table 1:** Binary opposition and the construction of Zimbabwean Nationhood.

| US | THEM |
|---|---|
| Heroes | Villains |
| Patriotic | Unpatriotic |
| Revolutionaries, comrades | Anti-revolutionaries, puppets |
| Nationalists | Traitors, sellouts |
| The people, the state | Enemies of the people, enemies of the state |

*Source: Melber, 2004; Chiumbu 2004*

Militaristic language was employed, with land occupations being labeled as the third *Chimurenga*, emphasising that this was a third series of struggle, and that the nationalist struggle had not been completed. Discursive statements such as 'Zimbabwe will no longer be a colony again' at one level, according to Willems (2004), were used to show how the nation-state had transitioned from colonial rule and white control of the agrarian sector and at another level the imminent dangers of re-colonisation if the third *Chimurenga* was not fulfilled and supported. War veterans employed similar methods of campaign as in the second *Chimurenga* such as holding the *pungwe*, singing of liberation songs, and at times violent coercion of the farmworkers to support the land occupation. The state-controlled broadcasting services revived and showed images of the liberation war and particularly the 'brutal' role played by whites during the liberation struggle. The aim was to evoke a sense of fear in the nation's consciousness through the symbolic violence of white colonial rule, and to pressure the populace to consent to the land occupation movement, which were referred to in militaristic language such as 'invasions', 'occupations', the 'third *chimurenga*', '*hondo ye minda*' (the struggle for land). Symbolic images through caricatures were also used to advance the political territorial strategy.

The intellectuals in the ruling party redefined the patriotic history narrative. A new patriotic history according to Tendi (2007) was developed around the themes of Mugabe's speeches and writings, which focused on land, race, sovereignty and patriotism, and the binaries inherent in these. In addition, the narrative pushed for the indigenisation of the

mineral economy to reduce international capital, which was viewed as contributing to the uneven development and neo-colonialism. The state-controlled media became the instrument for disseminating this new history. Education programmes on the war of liberation in particular ZANU-PF's role in liberation history, songs of liberation and half hourly catchy jingles extolling the exploits of the Third *Chimurenga* (Moyo, 2004; Tendi, 2007) – dominated both Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) television and radio. The ruling party saw the national media as a resource from which to fulfil its political-territorial strategy given that 60% of the population in the rural areas (its key electorate) and the majority of the working class depended on the state radio as the sole source of news and information. This perspective was informed by the former minister of Information and Publicity, Jonathan Moyo, who stated in an interview that '… information is a strategic issue which is critical in maintaining a country's sovereignty and you cannot claim to be sovereign if you do not own the means of disseminating information … we want to use the media to put across our national views …' (Moyo, 2004:23).

In addition to educational programmes broadcast on state media, the revised version of patriotic history was made compulsory in all government-owned schools. Furthermore, after 2000, government passed legislation that required all Zimbabwean youths who had completed their Advanced Level examinations to undertake a compulsory year of national service, which among other programmes aimed to re-educate the youth on patriotism and nationalism (Kriger, 2003). According to Gramsci (in Karriem, 2009:320) 'every relationship of hegemony is necessarily an educational relationship … educational relationships constitute the essence of hegemony and popular education has a key role to play in supporting the war of position', in this case the ruling party's political-territorial strategy in the face of a strong opposition. These youths (nicknamed Green Bombers) became the states' panopticon as part of the political strategy to maintain hegemony (Kriger, 2003; Rupiya, 2009).

The political-territorial strategy used by the ruling party during the land occupation movement and pursuance of the indigenisation strategy in the mineral economy throughout the decade of crisis was a politically driven process (Hammar et al., 2003). The notion of race, international capital, and constructed binaries set the stage for explaining how the politics of race shaped the outcome of FTLRP and in turn influenced how land recipients

redefined their relationship with whites and their environment. For the black Zimbabweans the cultural hegemony was based on the 'colonial legacy' that perpetuated their second-class status. As such, acquisition of white-owned large-scale commercial farms under the FTLRP signified the final process of decolonisation of the Zimbabwean people (Moyo and Yeros 2005). In the struggle for emancipation from (neo) colonialism, the political-territorial strategy adopted draws parallels to other global rural land occupations movements ranging from the MST in Brazil, Zapatista in Mexico, FARC in Columbia and UNOKRA in the Philippines to more recent movements in Africa albeit with varying modes of mobilisation and land occupations e.g. in South Africa, Malawi and Ghana. While these global movements are diverse in their approaches, ideology, strategy and tactics they share the same social base, opposition to neoliberalism and neo-colonialism and are militant on land and agrarian reforms by employing land occupation tactics within the countryside.

### *4.2 Creative Destruction? 'The Land is the Economy and the Economy is Land'*

Over the period 2000-2009, Zimbabwe experienced a sharp decline in its macro-economic environment, which had been bad since the late 1990s (Kanyenze, 2004). The country experienced a decline in foreign currency earnings caused by a decrease in exports, coupled with low levels of foreign direct investment, and reduced aid and balance of payment support (Fox et al., 2007; Clover and Erikson, 2009). By 2008 hyperinflation was at runaway rates and the country had the world's fastest shrinking economy for a country not at war (UNDP, 2008). Hyperinflation resulted in reduced disposable incomes in both urban and rural households, fewer remittances from the urban proletariat, and diminished value of crops traded. Moreover, shrinkages in employment meant that sources of off-farm income were curtailed. Consequentially, these factors had an adverse impact on sustaining livelihoods solely based on agriculture leading to land recipients adopting plural-activities to augment their livelihoods and turning to the intensive use of their natural resources as a coping strategy (Marongwe, 2008).

Faced with rapid economic decline, the state radicalised its economic policy between 2000 and 2008, it regulated agricultural inputs and food prices, and instituted controls over agricultural commodity markets, trade and financial markets (Moyo, 2011). The government parastatal Grain

Marketing Board (GMB) monopolised grain buying, while the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (RBZ) provided financial support for distressed agro-industries to improve the supply of inputs. Furthermore, the RBZ provided subsidies to the new farmers for purchasing machinery and equipment under its Farm Mechanisation Programme. According to Moyo and Yeros (2009), corruption emerged as various classes competed for access to the subsidies and agricultural equipment offered under this programme.

The discord between hope and reality punctuates the social narrative of the mining economy during this period. Discovery of world-class deposits of alluvial diamonds in the Marange District in eastern Zimbabwe in 2006 can be allegorically described as 'mana from heaven' in a period of severe economic and social crisis. This discovery offered important opportunities for the mobilisation of significant revenues. However, the new resources quickly became the subject of intense contestation involving the state and a variety of actors including mining communities, civil society, the diamond industry and donors (Saunders, 2017; 2018, Nyamunda, 2017).

The continued rise in ASM in the post FTLRP period is attributed to the declining economic environment in the country. While ASM became a distinctive pattern of accumulation and source of both livelihood and survival especially for the unemployed youths, it also became a confrontational zone between state and non-state actors due to elite capture (Mawowa, 2013; Malinga, 2018). The conflict in Zimbabwe's mining sector has been examined by Spiegel (2014), and Saunders (2016), who centralise the state's role in cracking down on ASM in the first decade of the century under 'Operation C*hikorokoza Chapera*' (end of informal artisanal mining). Saunders (2016) makes reference to police brutality in evicting diamond and gold miners. Yet, ASM continued to flourish due to the ability of *makorokoza* (informal artisanal miners) and/or *magweja* (informal alluvial diamond miners) to navigate and negotiate the political economy space in what Saunders (2016) calls an 'amicable' and clandestine connection between *magweja* and the security forces manning the diamond areas, and *makorokoza* and the political elites in gold mining areas. To some extent, the ASM also have amicable and sometimes symbiotic relationship with the formal and large-scale mining companies. This is supported by the findings of the Chamber of Mines of Zimbabwe (2015) study which concluded that the average ASM is older and married with more children than non-miners in their community, they have more

formal education, and earn and save more money than non-miner, and that there is significant potential and appetite for co-existence, collaboration and working together amicably with large-scale miners contrary to the perceptions of many.

In 2008 following a political stalemate from a highly disputed general and presidential election a government of national unity was formed through regional mediation (GPA, 2008; Moyo, 2011). In February 2009, the new coalition government adopted the multi-currency regime that comprised multiple foreign currencies (a process termed dollarisation) and the subsequent demonetisation of the Zimbabwe dollar in order to stimulate the economy and curb inflation. Dollarisation reversed inflation and allowed the economy to grow. Furthermore, the economy was liberalised and 'controls on agricultural markets, capital accounts and trade, and off-budget subsidies were abandoned' (Moyo, 2011:944). The government invited foreign investors, within the confines of the 'indigenisation' policy, which required domestic control of majority shares (Moyo, 2011).

## 5. Framing Zimbabwe's Agrarian and Mineral Sector Development 40 Years On

When reflecting 40 years on it is necessary to acknowledge that the radical FTLRP ended the bifurcation of agrarian land by race and to some extent class- wherein only black elites had been able to access and own commercial farmland. Since the FTLRP the agrarian structure that has emerged has been dominated by peasant and petty commodity producers. The programme was associated with the modification of existing settlement models (Table 2) that had been proposed under the LRRP II in 1997. What emerged was a communal subsistence-farming model A1 with two sub-variants: a villagised variant (similar to the Model A in the LRRP I) and a variant of self-contained, small farm units (see Figure 2). The A2 commercial model, which was to target people with 'capital assets, agricultural skills and entrepreneurial ability' (Fox et al., 2007), comprised four sub-variants: small, medium, large and peri-urban (see Figure 3). The remaining large estates for agribusiness constituted the third piece of the structure.

**Table 2:** Structure of the resettlement models under the LRRP I (1980 – 1999).

| Model | Scheme | Structure | Infra-structure | Tenure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A | Villagised | Nucleated village Individual arable land Communal grazing | Schools, feeder roads, clinics, boreholes, extension services | Individual permit for: -residential holding -cultivation -grazing land |
| B | Co-operative | Single farm under communal ownership | Use existing | Permit issued to co-operative |
| C | Outgrower | Individual plots around Agricultural Research and Development Authority (ARDA) estate | ARDA infrastructure and services | Permit |
| D and E | Ranching and game management | Rotational pasture | Varies | Undetermined |

*Adapted from Chigumira (2006)*

### *5.1 Empowerment through re-peasantisation*

The theory of social space is used to broach the subject of leveraging black economic empowerment through land and the mineral economy. It is concerned with analyses of the perceptions and relationships within and across the various groups, as a way of locating the obstacles to enhancing capabilities (Sen 1984) in the operationalisation of agriculture.

Two decades have passed since the implementation of FTLRP. Debates continue to be fraught with emotions and remain highly polarised between those who either justify or condemn the programme (Cliffe et al., 2011). The narrative that justifies this programme is based on moral arguments over redressing the past colonial injustices and demand for land by the poor (Mamdani, 2008; Moyo & Yeros, 2005; Moyo, 2011; Hanlon et al., 2012). From this vantage, the FTLRP is perceived as an historic epoch that is progressive −marking Zimbabwe's true moment of decolonisation and achieving social justice and black economic empowerment. Moyo and Yeros

(2005) and Chigumira, (2014, 2018) argue that the FTLRP has created the social and economic foundations for a more meaningful democratisation process, and a tri-modal agrarian structure under peasant production at the forefront as the pillar for economic growth and development.

**Figure 2: Structure of the A1 Resettlement Scheme under FTLRP.(Source: Ministry of Lands, 2004)**




**Figure 3: Structure of the A2 Resettlement Scheme Variant under the FTLRP. (Source: Ministry of Lands, 2004)**




The process of re-peasantisation is about people gaining access to land and entering the 'peasant condition' and 'peasant mode of production' from other backgrounds (van der Ploeg, 2008), while quantitatively it entails growth in the number of peasant/smallholder farmers. Re-peasantisation through the FTLRP not only de-racialised the former

large-scale commercial farms but also paved way for more ethnically diverse and inclusive territories. The new socially differentiated peasantry comprised of people drawn from differing demographic, socio-economic, regional and ethnic backgrounds, including landless people, unemployed youths, urban workers (military and police personnel, civil servants, and blue-collar workers), businessmen, former farm-workers and subsistence farmers from communal and old resettlement areas. The new peasantry identified foremost as either an A1 or A2 farmer before regional and ethnic identities.

### *5.2 Land, minerals and black consciousness*

Following the work of Davidson et al. (2007) on emotional geography, this monograph posits that the human world is constructed and lived through emotions (Bondi 2005) and that insights into emotional relations or encounters are important in the production of knowledge. Emotional geographies 'attempt to understand emotions − experientially and conceptually −in terms of their socio-spatial mediation and articulation rather than as entirely interiorised subjective mental state' (Davidson et al. 2007: 3). In this context, the FTLRP and the indigenisation policy on the mineral economy can be considered important to 'unshackling the chains of colonialism'. In a way, the large-scale white dominated commercial farming that persisted following independence was a continuing symbol of settler colonialism.

The FTLRP thus reawakened the political consciousness of black Zimbabweans. Freire (1978) posits that individuals might experience an epiphany and see themselves in the context of a new reality, but in truth, that reality is constructed to manipulate the individuals. It is envisaged that when the oppressed understand that manipulation and alienation exist, this realisation becomes the stepping-stone to experiencing the process of conscientisation. However, the process in itself does not take place in a vacuum. Berta Aliva (2003) points out that the process can be gradual or accelerated, depending on the conditions created for dialogue and reflection. For the Zimbabwean perspective, authentic becomes the act of naming the reality in which one exists with the understanding that reality is never static rather it is always changing. Darder (1995 in Berta Avila 2003: 119) 'stated it is a worldview or a historical outlook that puts into perspective the experiences that in this case black Zimbabweans confront in their daily lives. "Voice" becomes the political action that challenges the

domination that wants to keep the marginalised nameless and voiceless' (Hooks, 1989) The FTLRP provided that voice.

Frantz Fanon in *Wretched of the Earth* argues for violence against the coloniser as a means of unshackling the African from colonial bondage. Hence the symbolism in the use of emotional militaristic discourse and terms such as *third Chimurenga* was used during the farm occupation movement to ensure that the masses knew that the programme embodied the struggle for complete liberation from colonialism. The process brought back memories of the past and a subsequent need for blacks to unshackle themselves from other colonial institutions. Chigumira's (2014) study of three resettled communities in Sanyati District showed the movement from traditional Catholic and protestant churches (which were largely found in communal and old resettlement areas) to traditional African or syncretic forms of religion, such as the Vapostori, in Fast Track areas. The FTLRP provided a space for people to practise their syncretic religion and commune with the spirit world more openly. Chigumira's 2014 study points out how these syncretic religious beliefs became an important institution in safeguarding the physical environment. Furthermore, land recipients from this study who employed labour preferred to employ married men who could live and work with their families on the farm, which is another example of an African consciousness aimed at reversing colonial experiences where male labourers left their families in communal areas to work in white areas. Consequently, Chigumira's work shows the redistribution of land through the Fast Track restructured labour relations in a way that ruptured past signifiers of colonialism.

The de-racialisation of commercial farming (Moyo, 2013) under the FTLRP changed the unequal racial power relations that had previously existed and therefore represented symbolic progress to settlers. In other words, the FTLRP had physically and psychologically liberated land recipients from the white man because they had taken back their land and *nhaka* (inheritance). As a result, settlers felt they could communicate as equals with whites. Forty years on the legacy of the FTLRP can be seen through the symbolic representation of the emancipation of the subaltern African wherein prior the African had seen himself as lesser than the white-man as signified by lack of ownership or control of land and mineral resources.

D'Amore (1983) and Brohman (1996) posit that first, people must be

empowered to determine their own goals, needs, and desires for development. Second, they must be given opportunities to benefit economically and socially. As such the FTLRP and implementation of the Indigenisation Act were important programmes for empowering the subaltern. The argument advanced by these scholars is that one can only empower individuals that would have presented themselves for empowerment. Perhaps then the first stage in meaningful progress, may have to do with creating an environment in which the marginalised feel free and motivated to be part of economic processes and the FTLRP, and indigenisation policy created transformative context and space for black consciousness and empowerment.

Within the mineral economy, Moyo (2011, 502) argues that the land reform programme also opened new avenues for income generation such as small-scale gold mining, since it entailed the 'liberation of mineral resources, which had been hidden under the monopolistic large-scale mining and multinational companies'. Moyo's salient observation that much more was gained from redistributing land, primarily because it also led to increased access to other natural resources on the same land, is also picked up in the work by Mkodzongi (2013). According to Magure (2012) it is noteworthy that the ruling party's eleventh National People's Conference held in Mutare in December 2010 was entitled the 'Total Control of our Resources through Indigenisation and Empowerment'. At this conference ZANU-PF resolved to accelerate and broaden the indigenisation and empowerment programme. The arrangement was meant to ensure that local employees and managerial staff own and control key productive sectors of the economy, particularly in mining. This would be done through the employee and management share ownership scheme in foreign-owned companies under the auspices of the Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act signed into law in March 2008. This Act was instrumental in completing the revolution and completely unshackles the country from international capital that had taken the guise of neo-colonialism.

Companies that implemented the share ownership schemes were Schweppes Zimbabwe, which disposed of a 51% stake to employees and management, and Meikles Limited, whose employees received a 20% stake in the company (Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation News, 30 November 2011). Similarly, Magure (2012) reported that British American Tobacco Zimbabwe had placed a 21% stake to its employees and local

groups in compliance with the indigenisation policy. Community Share Ownership schemes were also structured amongst mining conglomerates. Section 14B of the Economic Empowerment (General) Regulations of 2010 provided that local communities whose natural resources are being exploited must receive shares in the business entities that are exploiting them. Community share ownership schemes countrywide comprised the Zvishavane Community Share Trust (Mimosa Platinum Mine); Chegutu-Mhondoro-Ngezi Zvimba Community Share Ownership Trust (Zimplats Mine); and the Tongogara Community Share Ownership Trust (Unki Mine). Tangibly, the Fast Track and Indigenisation process had brought development to the people, empowerment and unshackled the African from colonial and neo-colonialism hold.

### *5.3 Repeasantisation and the golden leaf revolution*

The effects of Zimbabwe's FTLRP were multi-fold, ranging from an immediate decline in production in the fifteen major agricultural commodities to a 'capital strike' in tobacco (Mazwi et al., 2020; Scoones et al. 2017). Initially, with the implementation of the FTLRP, the number of registered tobacco growers plummeted but then surged from 2003 as A1 farmers ventured into tobacco production (Mazwi et al., 2020; TIMB; 2017). Scoones et al., (2017) herald the tobacco boom led by the smallholder farmers as Zimbabwe's post-FTLRP achievements. This land (re)-distribution system made tobacco production pivotal to the new patterns of accumulation by small-scale farmers (Mazwi et al., 2020). Prior to the land reform programme, 1,500 large-scale predominantly white tobacco farmers produced 97 percent of tobacco in 2000, but the number of indigenous smallholder farmers rose to 110,000, producing around 65 percent of the crop by 2013. Tobacco production rose to exceed the pre-FTLRP levels with 2017 being the peak at 258,000 tonnes which the highest in post-independence Zimbabwe (Matibiri, 2019). Table 2 below shows the trends in the country's tobacco production.

Isolation by western powers following the FTLRP resulted in the government following a 'Look East Policy,' which scholars like Moyo and Nyoni (2013) infer as the catalyst for growth in tobacco contract farming and the significant growth in the number of tobacco growers. The expansion of the contract farming system modeled after Brazil facilitated the growth of the industry. The government supported a shift to this model as a way to address cost-related barriers faced by smallholder farmers wishing to

grow tobacco. By 2017, there were 38,103 A1 tobacco farmers, 7,658 A2 farmers, 46,621 communal farmers and 6,545 small-scale commercial farmers involved in tobacco farming (TIMB 2017).

**Figure 4:Tobacco Production Trends since the FTLRP in 2000 (Source: Matibiri 2019)**




Interestingly, there was also an increase in the number of auction floors. Prior to land reform, there were only two auction floors (Boka Tobacco Auction Floors and Tobacco Sales Floor). With the growth of contract firms involved in the tobacco industry changes in tobacco marketing also took place, which facilitated in the boom. Tobacco marketing branched into two systems, namely, auction floors and contract floors. Communal farmers dominate the auction floor markets while contract sales are dominated by A1 and A2 growers (Mazwi, et al. 2018). Critically, the value chain approach developed through 'tobaccorisation' has become an important model for the transformation of Zimbabwe's agriculture and food system into an US$ 8.2 billion industry, which the 'new dispensation' anchors in the Mnangagwa government's vision to attain a middle-income status by 2030.

### *5.4 Less transformative agrarian development*

On the other hand, it is important to provide a counter narrative to Zimbabwe 40 years on. Here the argument is that this redistributive programme, which sought to re-peasantise a formerly viable commercial farming sector, has brought an end to modernity and resulted in the abandonment of development (Worby, 2003; Richardson, 2005). This argument is advanced

through an economic lens, with particular reference to Zimbabwe's macro-economic plunge during the decade of crisis (Bond & Manyanya, 2002) and a focus on national level production trends since implementation of the programme (Raftopoulos, 2003; Selby, 2006). From this viewpoint, the FTLRP was retrogressive and destructive to the agricultural foundations of the country, impinging on food security and turning Zimbabwe from the 'bread-basket' of Southern Africa to a 'basket case' (Wiggens, 2004; Richardson, 2005; Bond, 2007).

Dore (2012) criticises the studies by Scoones et al. (2010) and Hanlon et al (2012) for their failure to be generalised across Zimbabwe's regions because of their focus on single agro-ecological regions – Mazowe and Masvingo. As such, these single case studies cannot be seen as evidence of a successful agrarian reform programme. Authors argue from a normative development model, which advocates large-scale commercial farming as the engine for economic growth and rural development. This narrative stipulates that only large-scale, intensive and highly specialised holdings can provide sufficient food to meet the needs of the world's population (van der Ploeg, 2007) and is therefore the driver for economic growth in rural localities. Thus, for countries undertaking land and agrarian reform programmes, the debate on land distribution (large versus small-holder agriculture) is seen as a struggle between Chayanovian versus Leninist positions. Essentially, Lenin took a different position on the confiscation of large estates and nationalisation of land including that of the peasants, whereas Chayanov argued for all land to be transferred to peasant farms (van der Ploeg, 2013).

The rationale put forward by Leninists is based on the idea that large-scale commercial agriculture provides the most productive and efficient option for farming, particularly because it has advantages in economies of scale. Farmers are in a better position to access credit from financial institutions and markets (local, regional and international), make use of information technologies and utilise capital-intensive equipment in their production processes compared to their counterparts (Johnson and Sender 2004; Dyer 2004). The 2020 Second Round Crop and Livestock Report showed the maize grain production was 24% below the five-year average of 1.2 million MT. Yield by communal farmers remained very low at 0.33 metric tonnes/hectare in comparison to the 1.82 metric tonnes/ hectare by A2 (medium to large-scale) farmers. The A2 farmers are still producing

below their expected potential. Government's smart commercial agriculture programme (formerly Command Agriculture) expected A2 farmers to produce at least 5 tonnes of maize per hectare (World Bank, 2019).

In view of the aforementioned and production trends, the argument currently positioned is that Zimbabwe has reversed its agrarian development gains through the FTLRP. It has failed to follow the historical experiences of the Asian tigers −Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and China−where redistribution of land to smallholders and subsequent agricultural growth stimulated industrialisation and urbanisation (Griffen et al., 2002; Fan & Chan-Kang, 2003; Chimhowu, et al., 2010). Instead and despite government-led egalitarian land distribution to smallholders has not generated higher rates of economic growth through a multiplier effect to other parts of the economy, compared to land concentrated in the hands of a relatively few individuals (as in large-scale farming) as observed by Jayne et al*.,* (2003) and Hebinck and Cousins (2010). Poverty levels are considerably higher and solely practicing agriculture has not provided secure livelihoods for peasant households, who are forced to engage in other activities to supplement their incomes.

In 2016, Zimbabwe adopted Command Agriculture (Special Maize and Wheat Programme) as its new agricultural intervention to unlock financing to the smallholder sector. Command Agriculture initiatives entailed government's guarantee to a private company to supply inputs to farmers and also incentives to farmers to deliver their produce to the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). Chisango (2018) postulated that, the programme instead of being a panacea to food security challenges bedeviling communities, the programme faced numerous challenges that included corruption in the allocation of resources, increased public expenditure, non-loan repayment, and continued low productivity among smallholder farmers mostly practicing dryland farming who are susceptible to climate-related shocks. Government availed financing to the tune of US$105 million in 2016, US$439 million in 2017, and US$238.3 million in 2018. Yet recovery in 2017 was only US$47 million, while US$81.3 million was recovered in 2018 (World Bank, 2019 p. 24). This implies very high and increasing non-payment rates from 54% in 2017 to 81% in 2018 in addition to a net cost to government of about 1.9% of GDP in 2017 and 0.7% in 2018 (World Bank, 2019).

Both the challenges experienced and attendant scrutiny necessitated

a shift from Command Agriculture to Commercial Smart Agriculture in 2019, which is now run under a commercial bank, the Commercial Bank of Zimbabwe (CBZ), with government as a guarantor. Under this new design, farmers are vetted for credit worthiness and resources provided for extension support. However, the continued weakness of the programme is that government continues to be in a position as it provides 100% guarantee to the programme. This means that while banks provide capital for the programme it is not at their risk and in fact it can introduce a moral hazard and less rigour in client monitoring, and loan payment recovery.

### *5.5 Blessed but Cursed: the windfalls of our mineral resources*

Zimbabwe's mineral economy has been affected by conflict(s) since the advent of colonialism. Madimu (2017) offers insights on farmer-miner-state contestations that he describes as constituting a 'long and entangled relationship' of farmers, miners and the state informed by the historical BSAC laws which favoured mining at the expense of farming (Madimu, 2017). Kusena (2015) and Kufakurinani and Bhamu (2015) take a food-security-based approach in highlighting the impact of resource-based conflicts in Zimbabwe, demonstrating the intricate linkages between conflicts and food (in)-security in Zimbabwe. Kusena (ibid) argues that the establishment of diamond mining companies in Chiadzwa in 2006 altered the livelihoods of the host communities especially when they were resettled. This turned the Marange diamonds to be perceived as a curse rather than a blessing due to constraints in the beneficiation chain (Kusena, 2019).

The discovery Marange's alluvial diamonds accentuated and deepened existing fault lines in state-society engagements around resources, and exposed the frailty of resource governance strategies in situations characterised by weak governance and institutional capacity, powerful executive authority and polarised political environments (Saunders, 2018). 'Diamonderisation' was a failed opportunity for the country to harness its natural resources build back better after years of recession and hyperinflation from the purported annual US$2 billion dollar industry. Elite capture and rent-seeking behaviour turned the resource into a curse marred by contestation, corruption and violence (Saunders 2018). The then Minister of Finance, Patrick Chinamasa acknowledged the management failure of Marange mining, observing that, 'there was greater economic impact from diamonds during times of uncontrolled alluvial panning than

what is being realised following introduction of formal diamond mining arrangements (Chinamasa (2015) in Saunders 2018).

Mlambo (2016) considers citizens as victims of the participation by local small-scale and semi-large-scale extractors in the extractive industry. The NGOs take an intergenerational justice approach in emphasising the significance of economic, environmental and social rights. Central to this approach are the concerns for the environment and the individual and collective rights of the community. They have been vocal and called for the reformation and transparency of the country's mining sector (Mtisi 2016). Narratives by NGOs implicate the state in the traversing of environmental, economic and social rights in the sector.

State influence spearheads elite accumulation and patronage through politicising the extraction and trading of natural resources (Mawowa 2013). Unfortunately, this has resulted in local communities being the losers in the game. As an example, the billion-dollar diamond industry failed to bring some of the basic indicators of development (electricity, access to safe and portable water, sanitation) for the local communities in Marange and the surrounding Buhera, Chipinge and Chimanimani districts. Evidently, 40 years on, international capital and a handful of elites linked to it are the winners of Zimbabwe's natural resource endowment while the majority remain cursed and bound to the chains of poverty.

## 6. Reconfiguring the Agriculture and Mining Sector for the Future

The monograph recognises the role played by the FTLRP and the Indigenisation and Empowerment policies set by the ruling government to reverse the division of land by race and in physically and psychologically emancipating black Zimbabweans from the 'shackles of colonialism.' Importantly, the endowment of the country through its natural resources was very important for black consciousness and control of land and mineral resources by the majority. Chigumira (2018) argues that the Fast Track programme widened the peasant-base (communal and old resettlement) in the country through a quantitative increase in the number of smallholders in Zimbabwe's rural landscapes by consolidating and creating new peasant household units under the A1 and A2 small-scale settlement variants. This peasant base continues to consolidate and increase through natural and social reproduction albeit with different asset accumulation and capabilities.

This monograph concludes that land reform can transform the lives

of poor peasants by removing distortions in the land ownership structure which allows them access to land and other natural resources which are critical for their social reproduction strategies and livelihoods security. The FTLRP opened up the rural landscape for a broad base of people from diverse backgrounds that straddle different social classes from both rural and urban areas. In fact, it provided for greater integration of rural and urban spaces which occurred, with resettled areas offering spaces for short-term wage employment for unemployed urbanites and urban spaces providing alternative commodity markets for resettled farmers (Chigumira 2018). However, women and young people are still at the margins of this broad-based development despite progressive legislation that ensures their title to land. The progressive quotas set for their access to land have not been met and women continue to be on the margins of financial inclusion as demonstrated by Mate in a related monograph.

The peasant economy is an intrinsic part of the modern feature of Zimbabwe 40 years on countering the development theory that sees a linear pathway to modernity and development through a transition from peasant-based to a highly industrialised society with large-scale farming as the anchor. The politics of patronage and elite capture have been key to the windfalls of the mineral economy – the curse of the resource. The mineral economy has been elusive to real developmental growth and poverty rates continue to increase. Through land reform, the new farmers gained particularly unique opportunities; ASM has also become a key livelihood activity, especially during the dry season when people are not farming. However, the country has not successfully harnessed its potential to grow and develop the rural economy despite the rich endowments.

In addition to issues of elite capture and international capital, the failure to harness Zimbabwe's natural resources in a way that benefits the majority can also be attributed to what Kamete (2007, 2012) calls the '*pathologisation of informality'* due to continued use of exclusionary colonial legislation such as the Regional, Town and Country Planning Act of 1976. The Act premised on British planning law articulates formality, order and a healthy and aesthetically pleasing environment as the norm for rural and urban development. This '*pathologisation of informality'* in the mineral economy and other sectors of the economy have in fact made the state less responsive to the changing socio-economic environment characterised by high unemployment, de-industrialisation and increased

levels of informality. Failure to understand that development is not linear, and that informality is another pathway for the attainment of livelihood and economic goals is incongruent with the current realities in the country. When forty years post-independence and the majority of economically active fall in the informal sector, then a revisit of normative perception of development and policy support is imperative to allow the realisation of desired developmental outcomes for the majority.

## 7. Conclusion and Recommendations: Where do we go from here?

The intention of this monograph was not to merely write about history and its injustices. Rather it is to take account of the past and assess how it impacts on the success of present development policies. Zimbabweans have to some extent experienced progress on inclusion and natural resource management, although by no means adequately so. A progressive development approach should be designed and implemented to enhance capacities to promote self-leadership and ownership of the development process. It is important to enforce institutional arrangements that allow the agriculture and small-scale mining sectors to bear the costs, thus promoting responsibility and entrepreneurial steering. Additionally, it will foster greater co-operation and synergy among sector players and with businesses and networks for advanced value chain development.

Entrepreneurial Economic Development goals have to be communicated, understood and recognised by citizenry, and not only by the government and the business sector, as is seemingly the case now. Undeniably, this may appear to be a more cumbersome and less appealing approach, but without a detailed intervention the goal of attaining development in Zimbabwe will remain elusive.

Hanlon et al. (2012) argue that Rhodesian and post-independence governments gave much support to white farmers and therefore the Fast Track farmers require the same level of support in order to thrive. Kinsey's (1999) long-term study of old resettlement areas shows a strong correlation in state support and farmer productivity. Mabeza-Chimedza (1998) talks of the miracle revolution among communal farmers in the 1980s and attributes it to state support through extension services and subsidies. While the government attempted to support farmers from input subsidy schemes such as Command Agriculture, this has come at a cost to the fiscus. As such, it is recommended that government creates an enabling business environment

for agriculture through (a) policies and regulations that are consistent; (b) research and development; (c) strong and improved extension support and farmer training; and (d) public-private partnerships to fund and subsidise agriculture to support the new farmers.

Rukuni's suggestion of the following structure of financial services for the agricultural sector:

i. Short-term financing for inputs and working capital;

iii. medium term finance 2-5 years for machinery, irrigation and infrastructure development; and

iii. long-term finance 6-25 years for building of large infrastructure like dams (Rukuni, Sokwanele 2013) continues to be relevant today for the agrarian sector. The imperative for public-private partnerships for farmers and in fact miners to access loans continues to be an imperative in the context of competition with international capital.

Furthermore, a holistic land policy needs to be put in place and adopted, which charts the future for agriculture in Zimbabwe across the tri-modal agrarian structure that has been created since the FTLRP. There needs to be clarity on tenure of both A1 and A2 farmers. Present tenure arrangements of offer letters, confirmation letters, *jeke's* (cards with plot numbers of the occupant of land) are not tradeable. The proposed 99-year lease as a legal document is not tradeable until all title deeds are remitted, and leases are registered. Creating a comprehensive cadastre and land administration and governance system can bring about this clarity. Increased tenure security based on an updated cadastre will provide incentives for farmers to make long-term investments in their farms and is likely to motivate to increase production and productivity. An updated cadastre will provide an important basis for establishing a National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI), which currently does not exist in Zimbabwe. NSDI is an effective and interoperable mechanism for generating, organising, coordinating, sharing, exchanging and leveraging geospatial information for decision-making and a location-based platform of action.

Despite the Indigenisation Act being amended in 2018 to only apply to diamond and platinum mining enterprises, large-scale mining remains in the hands of international capital and proceeds to the global richest 'one percent', while the ASM is the driver for local capital accumulation and poverty alleviation. As such, there needs to be recognition that 40 years on ASM, like Fast Track smallholder farming, is integral to Zimbabwe's

modern development trajectory and therefore an enabling policy and business environment needs to be created. Existing mining laws and policies, which focus on the 'established' small-scale mining entrepreneurs, need to better appreciate that ASM is still, for many, a vital source of income or coping strategy – and for whom artisanal mining can be a local strategy to advance smallholder agriculture as well (Mkodzongi and Speigel, 2018). This means formal recognition of ASM without the need for registration of the miners given the itinerant nature of the *makorokoza* and supporting the ASM value chain and technologies.

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