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Monograph ~ V

# Migration and Economic Development in Zimbabwe



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Development  
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## **Executive Summary**

Zimbabwe has a long history of migration which can be traced back to the 1980s. In the past two decades the country has lost a significant number of skilled and semi-skilled workers who migrated to countries such as United Kingdom (UK), United States of America (USA), Canada, Australia, South Africa (SA) and Botswana in search of greener pastures. Moreover, Zimbabwe has also seen an upsurge in irregular migration and mixed migration flows. The massive exodus in the 2000s was prompted by, for instance, a deteriorating economy, political turmoil and starvation. Nevertheless, continue to support their immediate and extended family members back home and they continue to contribute to economic growth and development through return of skills, remittances, investment project and co-development projects, etc. Highly qualified professionals such as teachers, engineers, nurses and doctors are an important source of investment capital and trade for Zimbabwe. However, the diaspora community is concerned about the poor access to investment and trade related information. Legal frameworks such the National Labour Migration Policy were formulated to make it easier for less skilled people to seek work abroad and offer them social protection, while at the same time strengthening mechanisms for harnessing remittances for economic development. Indeed, generally, migration is being recognised as a major human development issue which, depending on local contextual factors and how the migration process is managed, can either contribute towards or hinder socio-economic development in Zimbabwe.

### **1.1 Migration defined**

Migration is connected to the wider global economic, social, political and technological transformations that are affecting various policy issues. Zimbabwean migration is understood within the socio-economic context. The monograph seeks to highlight the patterns of migration in Zimbabwe and unearth the reasons for them. It will also clearly outline the effects of migration and the established migration governance framework at policy, institutional and legislative levels and consider how efficacious migration is to Zimbabwe's economic development. It will qualitatively explore both secondary and primary data regarding migration, remittances and developmental issues and seek to feed into the policy making machinery they can better harness the benefits of migration to the advantage of

Zimbabwe's development agenda.

Migration is the movement of people from one permanent place to another with the intention of settling in a new location permanently or temporarily. In most cases, the movement is over long distances and from one country to another but internal migration is also possible (World Migration Report, 2002). Migration of people within or outside a country has been a common phenomenon across the world. This movement changes the population of a place. To be more specific, it is important to categorise migration according to its types.

There are three major types of migration: a) internal migration, which occurs within a country; b) regional migration, takes place within a country from one county/state to another; c) and international migration, which takes place across boundaries. Internal and international labour migration was vital in the development of southern African political economies (McGregor, 2012). Internal migration is human migration within one geopolitical entity, usually a nation-state. Much of the interest in internal migration in developing countries has focused upon population movements from the rural to urban sectors (Lucas, 2015). Internal migration is recognised as an important mechanism through which the vast distribution of people changes over time (Greenwood, 1997). International migration entails the movement of people from one country to another. Masiwa and Doroh (2011) defined international migration as the act of leaving one's country of birth for a foreign country, for various reasons such as joining families abroad. It involves change of residence over national boundaries.

A migrant is a former member of the household who within the last ten years has moved away for at least three months for either work or study reasons and is currently away (Dzingirai, Egger, Landau, Litchfield, Mutopo and Nyikahadzoi, 2015). An international migrant is a person who moves to another country. There are three types of international migrants: legal immigrants, illegal immigrants, and refugees. The former are those who moved with the legal permission of the receiver nation, illegal immigrants are those who moved without legal permission, and refugees are those who crossed an international boundary to escape persecution. However, the Zimbabwe Statistics Agency (2019) defined international migrants as persons born outside Zimbabwe.

For a long time, migration has been used as a way for households to search for work, improve their livelihoods and increase their incomes,



as well as to escape dire situations of persecution, conflict and poverty (Dagdemiir, Kartal, Tinas, Gurbuz, 2018). According to the World Bank Migration and Remittances Report of 2016 approximately 3.4% of the world population lives in a country other than the country of birth (Dagdemiir et al., 2018). Although global migration crises in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean at present attract the attention of the international press and national governments, much less is written about the movements of people within their own borders or within the same geographical zone to neighbouring countries (Dzingirai et al., 2015). There are basically four major forms of migration and these are: invasion, conquest, colonisation and immigration (Caves, 2004).

## **1.2 The Zimbabwean context**

Emigration from Zimbabwe is not a new phenomenon. For example, the migration of Zimbabweans to South Africa to seek job opportunities in the mining industry started as early as the beginning of the twentieth century (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Zimbabwe has two migration histories that is the old and the new, generally corresponding to the pre- and post-independence periods. When we look at Zimbabwe's post-independence emigration flows, two major phases can be distinguished. The first phase corresponds to the years following the country's independence in 1980. According to Tevera and Crush (2003) between 1980 and 1984, 50,000 to 60,000 whites left the country because they could not adapt to the changed political environment and the net migration loss was over 10,000 per year. The second phase, from the period 1990s to 2009 shows much more diverse and multifaceted migration patterns when compared to the first phase (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). As a direct consequence of the austerity measures associated with the adoption of the Economic Structural Adjustment Programme in October 1990, migration was adopted as a survival strategy (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017). International migration from Zimbabwe scaled up after 2000 due to the economic and political crisis. By July 2008, the Zimbabwean migration stock was estimated at four million (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017).

Migration followed the tribal warfare-based movements with roots in South Africa and appears to have begun with colonialism. In the early 1890s and early 1900s, pacified Africans migrated to farms, and new towns of Bulawayo, Salisbury, Gwelo and Fort Victoria and their surrounding mines and farms. There are contradicting views about the reasons of

this migration. Some scholars say the movement was non-voluntary and persuaded, mainly comprised of poor tribesmen migrating to raise the required head tax imposed by the colonial administration to create labour for the development of the colonial economy (Dzingirai, 2015). Others have argued that Africans migrated in response to the attractive opportunities of the new cities and the possibility of liberty from traditional control (Brycesson, 2001). One is tempted to believe that migration arose from a blend of these two processes but the debate shows questions of agency in migration decision making. The 1960s and 1970s saw two different patterns which exemplify the factors at play in migration choices. During the 1960s Africans shifted their migration to South Africa, the main end point being the gold fields. In many ways this migration can be considered spontaneous, given the very low standard of living of most of the population, although some young African males would undertake such migration to demonstrate their manhood and readiness to assume marriage.

As with the migration of the early 1900s, this regional migration was spherical, migrants dithering between home and destination (Dzingirai, et al., 2015). A further development in this old migration arose in the late 1970s. The prolonged war for independence caused enormous internal and external migration in search of safe zones. Towns tended to be relatively safer than rural areas, explaining why Salisbury and Bulawayo were attractive destinations (Anich, Crush, Melde and Ouchu et al., 2014). After the liberation war, urban to rural migration was characterised by a return to rural areas. The old migration was largely personal, circular and political. The new migration starts after independence in the 1980s and continues to the present. This migration orbits around economic reforms and can be described as having two waves. The first wave of this migration peaks in the late 1990s in response to structural adjustment with the second wave peaking in the 2000s following a populist land reform that saw in 2008 the virtual collapse of the economy with GDP contracting by 50%, inflation peaking at 231,000,000% in July and capacity utilisation in industry falling below 10% (UN Zimbabwe Country Analysis Report, 2014).

### **1.3 Zimbabwe's migration flows: Patterns and causal factors**

It is widely recognised that the main countries of destination of Zimbabwean emigration flows are the neighbouring countries of South Africa, Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

South Africa appears to be the principal destination country, followed by Botswana. According to a study conducted by Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) which is based on the estimates of the year 2005: 11,620 emigrants left the country, mainly to African countries (6,256) and European countries (3,758). According to the study the main destination country was the UK (3,486), followed by Botswana (1,524), SA (1,502) and Mozambique (1,390). Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) are of the view that the current economic crisis that Zimbabwe is facing appears to be the main driver of emigration flows and cross-border migration is one of the key survival strategies for many households.

Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia are party to the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol (hereafter, the Convention), as well as to the 1969 Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa. According to article 1A of the Convention, a refugee is someone who, 'owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality, and is unable to or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country'. Refugees in these four countries are for the most part assigned to refugee settlements and supported by the respective governments, along with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and its implementing agencies (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). According to Kiwanuka and Monson (2009) attitudes to Zimbabweans appear to be more positive in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia rather than in Botswana, where the local populations in the former were perceived by Zimbabweans as more friendly and helpful than locals in the latter, and evidence shows that many communities support Zimbabwean migrants with food, employment and accommodation. Zimbabwean migration into Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia is of a mixed nature, motivated by a combination of material and economic need, political repression, and/or family links across the borders (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

Southern Africa has a long history of population movements – mobility has been a central and defining feature of the region's politics, economy and culture. In the past twenty years, an increasing number of people have migrated to escape poverty, seek livelihoods or escape from political

upheavals and civil strife, such as the Mozambican and Angolan civil wars – whose effects on regional development continue to be felt to this day. The patterns and scale of these population movements are constantly in flux. While we show that issues of immigration control and xenophobic violence are less prominent in popular debates in Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia than in South Africa, we note that governments and civil societies in other southern African countries are not prepared or capacitated to respond to sustained, large-scale flows of migrants such as those originating from Zimbabwe over recent years (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

Although literature consistently observes that, second to South Africa, Botswana is the primary destination for Zimbabwean migrants, the quality of data available in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia appears too poor to reliably assess the scale of migration flows and compare the scale of Zimbabwean migration across the four countries (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Botswana has the most exclusionary policy towards Zimbabweans, regularly deporting large numbers and limiting their access to basic social services (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). With this important exception, where there is some resentment, citizens of most countries were sympathetic to Zimbabweans. It is not likely that we will see xenophobic violence of the type witnessed in South Africa in 2008 in these other Southern African countries (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

Botswana appears to issue more work permits to Zimbabweans than any of the other three countries, and a relatively large number of Zimbabweans reportedly work within its government structures (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). In addition, Botswana has granted asylum to 825 Zimbabweans, who are housed in Dukwi Refugee Camp in the north of the country. In Botswana, health policy is silent on the topic of migrant and refugee healthcare, and only nationals receive free antiretroviral therapy (ART). Treatment has not even been extended to refugees, let alone other categories of migrants. The official responsible for security and refugees in the Office of the President reported that this was because the state does not yet have adequate resources to provide ART to the full population of citizens living with HIV, making it impractical to provide it (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Pophiwa (2018) pointed out to the impact of the Zimbabwean crisis on neighbouring countries, which tends to emphasise the burden of hosting economic

refugees. In countries like South Africa the presence of Zimbabweans is largely associated with their stories of migration as victims of the crisis in their country (Pophiwa, 2018).

Mozambique has historically rejected claims by most Zimbabweans who applied for asylum based on the presumption that they are voluntary economic migrants, though this approach may be in the process of changing (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Zambia has started working with the immigration office in an attempt to produce better information about Zimbabwean immigrants crossing the Chirundu border (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). In Mozambique, which has a strong historical relationship with the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) leadership in Zimbabwe, there seemed to be widespread political pressure to underplay the levels of and motives for Zimbabwean migration in order to resist acknowledging the complexity of the crisis in the country (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). In Malawi and Zambia, asylum was granted to the few Zimbabweans who applied, and these small numbers of refugees are housed in the Dzaleka (Malawi) and Maheba (Zambia) camps (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

It is worth noting that contingency plans were made in all four countries for the possibility of large numbers of asylum seekers emanating from Zimbabwe – including the establishment of six reception centres in Zambia. However, with applications remaining extremely low, the institutions in question have come to perceive migration from Zimbabwe as largely outside their mandate. The reception centres have been closed due to lack of demand, and the humanitarian needs of Zimbabweans remain invisible and unaddressed unless these migrants lodge applications for asylum (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Although many Zimbabweans qualify for refugee status under either the 1951 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or 1969 Organisation of African Union (OAU) definitions, they also bear the burden of supporting families remaining in the home country.

By its very nature, this responsibility requires the ability to work and remit, but refugee status largely confines applicants to rural camps offering few or no livelihood opportunities, and prevents cross-border mobility that would create income-generating options other than conventional employment. In host countries with high unemployment rates, cross-border trade is often the only income-generating option open

to Zimbabweans – and this requires the ability to cross the border back into Zimbabwe on a regular basis. Furthermore, commodity shortages in Zimbabwe have meant that remittances are largely in the form of physical goods delivered to the home country. Once again, this often requires migrants to return home with goods for their families (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). A large number of Malawi citizens (formerly Nyasaland) emigrated to Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) during the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland of 1953 to 1963. After acquiring Zimbabwean citizenship, some of them have moved back to Malawi with their families, where they are actually viewed as ‘home-coming’ instead of being regarded and immigrants (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

In all four countries, emergency medical services are provided free for migrants in critical condition and with no means to pay. This has given rise to some pregnant women from Zimbabwe seeking childbirth services in Botswana and Mozambique. However, research did not suggest that Zimbabwean migration is of a primarily health-seeking nature. Zimbabweans’ primary reason for migration was livelihood-seeking, but considering the situation of humanitarian crisis in their home country, access to general medical care in some of the case-study countries was naturally perceived as an advantage of migration. In Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, public and private hospitals and clinics offer health services without specific prerequisites relating to nationality or legal status. Fieldwork confirmed that there is no requirement for identity documents to access health and other services in these three countries – indeed in some countries not all citizens have identity documents.

Existing literature confirms that in Mozambique healthcare personnel do not ask about national origin when providing services (Arenas 2008). However, in Botswana, only refugees may access free healthcare and other public services, such as free primary education (through UNHCR and government support). Documented migrants must pay higher fees than the local population for their medical expenses in government clinics and hospitals. Of course, not all migrants are in a position to afford this (Oucho and Ama, 2006), which may put their health and public health at risk. Undocumented migrants face the same situation of vulnerability, since public services other than emergency healthcare are limited to those able to produce legal identification documents. The fear of being sent back to Zimbabwe prevents many irregular migrants from accessing health and

other public services, as observed by a female undocumented migrant (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

#### **1.4 Trends and key drivers**

In Zimbabwe's high migrant sending areas (including Chiredzi, Chipinge, Gwanda, Bulilima and Plumtree), more than 80% of households have at least one family member who is an irregular migrant, (United Nations Zimbabwe Country Analysis Report, 2014, Raftopoulos, 2011, Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006). Regarding the nature of migrants leaving Zimbabwe during this time, it is possible to identify two groups. The first, and largest, group consists of unskilled workers. These migrants choose nearby destinations such as South Africa. They tend to work for relatively short periods and in menial jobs, for example as farm labourers, domestic works and casual workers. Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera (2012), and others, describe some of this group as survival migrants, fleeing persecution and extensive livelihood breakdown in Zimbabwe but that more broadly the profile of migrants from Zimbabwe to South Africa is mixed, consisting of both refugees seeking long term refugee status, and those seeking temporary economic opportunities, with a range of motivations and intentions concerning duration.

The table (overleaf) shows the distribution of migrants by company on migration and sex in Zimbabwe. The highest proportion of migrants moved alone (48.4%) followed by those who moved as an entire household (21.6%) and those who moved with parents about 11%. With the exception of migrants who moved with those not related to them, all categories were dominated by females (Zimstat, 2019). The literature suggests that migrants tend to be those who are no longer employed as a result of closure of industries (Raftopoulos, 2011) and are people living on less than a dollar a day (Bracking and Sachikonye, 2006, Raftopoulos, 2011). Furthermore, migrants are drawn from households whose consumption expenditure per capita is below the food poverty line. Poverty is indeed severe in Zimbabwe: the UN Country Office report (UN, 2014) suggests that almost 80% of the rural population is poor, compared to just under 40% in urban areas. A study suggests that households with migrants are better off than those who do not have migrants (Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera, 2012; Anich et al., 2014). One important channel for this is remittances.

**Table 1: The distribution of migrants by company on migration and sex, Zimbabwe 2019 LFCLS**

Company on migration	Number				%				Within		Sex (Overall)
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Male	Female	
<b>Alone</b>	406 764	425 929	832 693	48.8	51.2	100	51.6	45.6			48.4
<b>Entire household</b>	180 275	190 814	371 089	48.6	51.4	100	22.9	20.5			21.6
<b>Spouse</b>	20 478	28 285	48 763	42	58	100	2.6	3			2.8
Son/daughter	2378	65 186	67 564	3.5	96.5	100	0.3	7			3.9
<b>Parent(s)</b>	85 479	106 531	192 009	44.5	55.5	100	10.8	11.4			11.2
<b>Brother/sister</b>	42 709	47 105	89 814	47.6	52.4	100	5.4	5			5.2
<b>Other relative</b>	21 140	23 076	44 216	47.8	52.2	100	2.7	2.5			2.6
<b>Not related</b>	1 362	54	1 416	96.2	3.8	100	0.2	0			0.1
<b>Part of household</b>	28 189	46 052	74 242	38	62	100	3.6	4.9			4.3
<b>Total</b>	788 774	933 032	1 721 806	45.8	54.2	100	100	100			100

Source: Zimstat, 2019



## 1.5 Socio-politico-economic crisis in Zimbabwe

Periods of migration are divided into sections, beginning with the war of liberation (1960-1979) to 1990; 1991 to 1997 and 1998 and beyond (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017). However, this section will mainly focus on the 2000s (current migration), which signify a period of unprecedented social, political and economic turmoil in the history of Zimbabwe (Mawowa and Matongo, 2010). Unemployment rose to over 70%, resulting in scores of people migrating from the country in search of better opportunities. The major forms of migration and cross-border movements that have thrived since the 1990s are the following: irregular migration, informal cross-border trade, migration of highly skilled nationals, and survival migration of the poor and penurious (Tevera and Crush, 2003). This then is the new migration, a movement of people that is largely driven by economic circumstances. Over the past two decades, Zimbabwe has experienced significant changes with regard to international migration flows. Historically, Zimbabwe has been a country of origin, transit and destination all the same time (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Since the turn of the millennium many people began to *immigrate to different countries* mainly because of economic and political instability. The extent to which this delineation of migration is applicable may be disputed but it does not need a rocket scientist to believe that migration in Zimbabwe has a long history. It starts in colonial times and continues in the post-independence state in response to economic pressure. In the section below we look at the patterns of current migration.

Additionally, political reasons are a contributing factor to the migration of people in Zimbabwe. During the 2008 period, the political havoc pushed many people out of the country as they could not endure the pressure. The majority left after 2000 when the economic and political situation in the country started to deteriorate. The national elections of 2002, 2005 and 2008 were characterised by violence, where ZANU-PF party members targeted the opposition (MDC) and members of the civil society with violence (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). A research report by the Forced Migration Studies Programme (FMSP) at University of the Witwatersrand shows that at the height of economic crisis in Zimbabwe there were three types of cross-border flows into the southern African region (FMSP 2009: 27): (i) individuals fleeing political/structural violence and/or persecution; (ii) economic migrants and, (iii) visitors who embarked on short-term trips

to see relatives who had migrated to neighbouring countries. The majority of the migrants did not have the legal documentation but they found their way into neighbouring borders such as South Africa (Pophiwa, 2018). Most Western countries were sympathetic to the victims of the violence and offered them political asylum (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011).

A number of significant characteristics can be identified with regard to emigration flows and, more generally, cross-border movements that have occurred since the 1990s. First, there has been a progressive rise in emigration flows and cross-border movements; this rise has accelerated since the turn of the millennium 2000, as the national economic situation dramatically deteriorated (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). According to Pophiwa (2018) the late 1990s witnessed levels of indescribable suffering to ordinary citizens as households grappled with the rising costs of living, the diminish in the currency and company closures. Throughout the 1990s, poverty in towns became a common challenge as economic hardships tormented citizens, and much of the poverty reduction projects and interventions were focusing on rural Zimbabwe (Pophiwa, 2018). The dynamics of economic decline in Zimbabwe during the 1990s shaped future economic and political developments in the post-2000 period. The new millennium witnessed a crucial decade in post-independent Zimbabwe with serious socio-politico-economic crisis which was unforeseen in the previous decades.

Moreover, the complex crisis that has imprisoned Zimbabwe since 2000 has manifested in various forms causing agony to its citizens. These include a dwindling employment market, triple or four-digit inflation, a sometime dearth of available commodities, rising child mortality rates and falling life expectancy and a governance crisis experienced as political violence, uncertainty and cultural and social isolationism. Pophiwa (2018) pointed to the period of crisis as from the early 2000s when the country faced an economic meltdown characterised by hyperinflation, commodity shortages, political violence, etc. The 2000s signified a period of unprecedented political and economic mayhem in Zimbabwe's history (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). The economic meltdown served primarily as a trigger which ignited the acceleration of migration to neighboring countries and diaspora. The Zimbabwe crisis has been accompanied by a highly informal regime of accumulation. As the formal economy receded, informality became the order of the day and perhaps the most significant

arena for meaningful accumulation and household economic survival. In this economic sphere, Zimbabwe’s elites, who often manipulated their hold on the state’s coercive apparatus, competed with ordinary and poor Zimbabweans. This informality was spurred by Zimbabwe’s economic reality and mediated by the nature of the post-colonial state as a contradictory site of both accumulation and hegemonic construction.

Migration was caused by inter-related factors ranging from political and economic instability, poverty, low returns to labour, unemployment, increased informalisation of the economy, fluctuation in prices of basic commodities and their erratic supply (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017). The seeds of the severe economic instability that affected the country after the year 2000 were sown in the late 1990s. In November 1997, a politically motivated decision was made to pay each of the 50 000 war veterans a belated and unbudgeted one-off payment of Z\$50,000 and a Z\$2,000 monthly pension for their participation in the liberation war (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017). From there onwards economic indicators dipped. Thus, after 2000, service delivery systems became completely dysfunctional or collapsed. The central cause of large-scale migration from Zimbabwe is political instability, which gave birth to social and economic instability creating a combination of factors that ruined people’s livelihoods (Madebwe and Madebwe, 2017).


**Table 2: Migration trends from 2000 – 2015**

<b>Period</b>	<b>Number of Migrants</b>	<b>Percentage (decline or Increase) of Migrants</b>
2015	398, 866.00	0.25%
2010	397, 891.00	1.32%
2005	392, 693.00	4.32%
2000	410, 041.00	4.91%

*Source: World Bank, 2020*

The table above shows that, in percentage terms, over the period 2000 to 2015 the general trend is that the number of migrants was declining steadily, with the biggest decline experienced between 2005 and 2010 where a 3-percentage point drop was registered. By 2015, the drop had dropped to only 0.25 of a percentage point drop. Between 2000 and 2005 there was 0.59 of a percentage point drop.

**Figure 1: Zimbabwe: Unemployment rate from 1999 to 2020**



Source: Plecher, 2020.

The statistics above shows the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2020. In 2020, the unemployment rate in Zimbabwe was at 4.99%. A significant number of Zimbabweans migrate due to the need to seek employment opportunities and greener pastures. This has been the main reason that has pushed many people to leave. Griswold (2018) opines that immigrants complement native-born workers and raise general productivity through innovation and entrepreneurship. Like most modern societies, Germany has experienced a significant inflow of migrants during the last decades (Damelang and Haas, 2012). In the years between 1987 and 2001, Germany even absorbed more immigrants in absolute numbers than the traditional immigration countries Australia and Canada together (Damelang and Haas, 2012).

### 1.6 Benefits of migration for Zimbabwe

Throughout the world, the migrants in the diaspora plays an important role in the development of the home countries’ economies through remittances, skills and technology transfers, investments, trade as well as the creation of social and professional networks that advance the countries’ developmental needs (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Diaspora is a term used to describe people living abroad and has also been loosely adopted to incorporate people the Zimbabweans who are beyond the borders. Migration and integration have lasting effects on economic and social processes (Damelang and Haas, 2012). There is a nexus between migration and economic development. Accordingly, economic development entails the improvement in economic

welfare through higher real gross domestic product (GDP), as well as, other economic indicators such as improved literacy, better infrastructure, reduced poverty and improved healthcare standards (Pettinger 2019). In light of this, economic development creates wealth from which benefits are realised.

### ***1.6.1 Employment opportunities***

At the beginning of the 21st century international and local media took great interest in Zimbabwe's crisis (Pophiwa, 2018). The 2000s witnessed a massive exodus of Zimbabweans across the world. Majority of the people emigrated when the political/economic crisis started during 2000–2004 (Masiiwa and Doroh, 2011). In fact, some of them were recruited by employment agencies based in Zimbabwe among these were medical doctors, business people, technicians, teachers, nurses, bankers, artisans and sports people. The causes of migration in Zimbabwe appear to be associated strongly with poverty (Dzingirai et al., 2015). One feature of the mixed nature of migration from Zimbabwe is that it also includes professionals, who are mainly settled in the UK, New Zealand, Australia and Namibia. The Middle East and Asia are not professionals' preferred destination, except for some very specific sectors of engineering, aviation and insurance. Zanamwe and Devillard (2009); Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera (2012) and Anich et al. (2014) provide excellent discussions of brain drain in the context of migration from Zimbabwe. The causes or triggers of migration in Zimbabwe appear to be associated strongly with poverty (Dzingirai et al., 2014).

#### **• *Health professionals***

A large number of Zimbabwean medical doctors have been absorbed in health systems of other countries. Most of those who initially migrated were more experienced nurses with skills that were marketable abroad, leaving behind junior and less-experienced staff (Chikanda, 2010). According to Chikanda and Dodson (2015) Zimbabwe has lost a substantial number of its medical doctors through migration to countries such as UK, USA, Canada and SA. Zimbabwean migrants now view these countries not as places of temporary economic opportunity for survival but rather as places where they can build a future for themselves and their families. These losses have however brought some gains through remittances and other diaspora engagement initiatives. The better remunerations that migrants

earn are the basis for remittances that are sent home to support families and communities (Chikanda, 2010). Remittance flows do benefit both the migrants' households and the non-recipient ones through multiplier effects of spending.

- *Teachers*

Zimbabwe has experienced socio-economic and political turmoil since the year 2000, which has led to an exodus of Zimbabwean citizens (Villier and Weda, 2017). Zimbabweans have been leaving, particularly for South Africa, due to the difficult conditions in their home country. Zimbabwean teachers constitute the largest group of migrant teachers in South Africa (Department of Higher Education & Training, 2013). The political crisis in Zimbabwe caused teacher migration in the presence of other social and economic drivers. Zimbabwean teachers migrated to other countries to escape the generally poor conditions prevailing in Zimbabwe during the 2000s. The Progressive Teacher's Union of Zimbabwe, (2008) at the time stated that around 35,000 teachers had left Zimbabwe by 2009, mainly designated for Botswana, SA and the UK. According to Villier and Weda (2017) SA already home to 10,000 Zimbabwean teachers by 2004, where approximately 4,000 of these were qualified science and mathematics teachers. It is generally accepted that not all Zimbabwean teachers are employed in the education sector. An estimate of up to 47% of the migrant Zimbabwean teachers in South Africa end up working in other sectors (Villier and Weda, 2017).

- *Non-professional migrants*

Non-professionals is another group of migrants which have left driven (Pophiwa 2018) by shortages of basic commodities, when Zimbabweans turned to the black market with piles of valueless Zimbabwean dollars to exchange them for United States Dollar (USD) or South African Rand (ZAR) and then resorted to shopping in nearby border towns. Images of Zimbabweans cutting through the border fence into South Africa to escape the biting effects of the economic meltdown became a common sight (Pophiwa, 2018). Most migrated to South Africa, Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia. Regularizing the migrants' stay and providing them with employment opportunities would provide more income and skills development opportunities that would benefit Zimbabwe in the medium to long term (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Zimbabwe's economic crisis

precipitated an exodus of professionals and skilled workers emigrating in search of better economic opportunities.

### ***1.6.2 Knowledge and skills transfer and entrepreneurship***

According to the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) (2005) report, nearly three-quarters (73%) of Zimbabweans in the diaspora would be willing to participate in a skills transfer programme in order to contribute to the development of Zimbabwe. The migration of Zimbabweans brings with it opportunities that may bring benefits to the Zimbabwean society in general, as well as to migrants and their families (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). The government has had direct engagement with some organisations coordinating activities of the people in the diaspora. The new language of engagement is phrased in technical discourses of development and reconstruction, and is dominated by debates over financial investment and the harnessing of skills (McGregor, 2011). It has facilitated and sequenced the short-term return programme for medical professionals and the Professionals Return programme.

The IOM has also been working with Government of Zimbabwe and other interested partners on a number of initiatives regarding migration and development. The IOM in 2008 summarised its involvement as strengthening the capacity of the with government to effectively manage migration for national development and to implement specific interventions that promote the involvement of migrant populations in development processes in Zimbabwe, and facilitating the return and reintegration of qualified nationals in the diaspora (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Host governments can help diaspora-led investment in Zimbabwe by providing fair employment opportunities for legal immigrants their countries and should also consider recognising their academic and professional qualifications. This would provide immigrants with the work experience needed in their home countries, including Zimbabwe. Besides cross-border trade, employed Zimbabweans work mainly in agriculture, construction, domestic work, and the service industry. Recipient countries generally view the presence of skilled Zimbabweans as positive and in some cases also acknowledge the less skilled as hard-working and valuable contributors to the host society (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009).

A significant number of highly qualified professionals (teachers, engineers, nurses, doctors etc.) as well as some non-professional migrants are so hard-working that if granted permission to work (or start own

businesses) legally, they can be an important source of investment capital and trade for Zimbabwe. They can also facilitate technology transfers and bring the best business practices in their professions to Zimbabwe (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). However, some are forced to do piece jobs illegally but at the risk of losing their asylum status or being deported back to Zimbabwe. The income they can raise from their illegal work is barely enough to send home for consumption purposes; not speaking about investment. Having resident and work permits in the host country is a status desired by all Zimbabweans in the diaspora (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). With this, a person can work, establish a business and visit home whenever they wish. Such conditions are conducive for investment and trade for the immigrants.

### **1.6.3 Increasing income**

Migration increases household income given that the emigrants send remittances in various forms though usually in the form of money. According to Masiwa and Doroh (2011) migrants living legally in the host countries, with resident and work permits are able to engage in legal economic activities, which earn them enough income to invest, back home. While some of migrant income is remitted formally, through for example transfer agencies and, more recently, mobile banking, much of it is through informal networks based on trust (Bracking and Sachikonye 2006). The use of ‘*omalaitshas*’, personal couriers, relatives and spouses and other religious networks are noteworthy forms of remitting income and goods. Because they are based on trust, these forms have their own risks. However, they remain attractive to the poor migrants who often cannot afford formal channels of remitting income or goods (Dzingirai et al. 2014). Regarding its use, remitted income is often used to ensure food security among sending households (Crush and Tevera 2010.). While it is true that a large part of remitted income is invested in non-productive areas such as funerals, marriage, and ceremonies, and of course food, it appears that some is directed towards economic production, including purchasing of livestock, land and small business (Dzingirai et al., 2015).

#### **1.6.3.1 REMITTANCES**

Remittances are monetary transfers made by migrants to their country of origin or the financial flows associated with migration. Remittances are domestic if sent by family members within a country, for example, those



in towns and international when sent by family members living outside the country. According to Dzingirai et al. (2015) remittance behaviour varies between male and female migrants, with men tending to remit more cash than women. This may reflect different work opportunities and pay structures at destination: the most common occupation for men at destination is skilled construction, whereas for women it is domestic service (Dzingirai et al., 2015). The degree of investment depends on the level of income, which is in-turn influenced by one's resident status, age and number of years spent in the host country. Masiwa and Doroh (2011) state that the impact remittances make depend on whether they are spent on consumption or investment.

If saved or invested, they have a multiplier effect on the economy. Remittances have positive growth such as enhancing effects like financing development projects, which include schools, clinics and other infrastructure; human capital; entrepreneurship and bank deposits (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Those staying legally in the host countries, with resident and work permits are generally able to engage in legal economic activities, which earn them enough income to invest, back home. The other categories are not allowed to work and therefore find it difficult to raise funds to invest back home. Ironically, a considerable number in this group are highly skilled and hard-working.

### **1.6.3.2 REMITTANCES IN DIFFERENT NATIONAL CONTEXTS**

Massey and Parrado (1998) show that remittances from Mexican migrant workers in the US provide an important source of start-up capital in 21% of the new businesses in 30 communities in West-Central Mexico. Similarly, Dustmann and Kirchamp (2001) find that the savings from returning migrants are a vital source of start-up capital for small businesses. Woodruff and Zenteno (2001) provide evidence that remittances account for almost 20% of the capital invested in small businesses in a greater part of urban Mexico. Within international development, much hope has been invested that remittances provide an accessible pathway out of poverty, and an alternative to inter-governmental and official systems of development assistance (IOM, 2007). Connected with measures that encourage and facilitate the transmission of remittances through formal channels, there should be policies that seek to increase the flow of remittances from the diaspora (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Additionally, for Sub-Saharan Africa, there is evidence of positive developmental impact.

This generally positive view does, however, have strong detractors, particularly over the role remittances can play in exacerbating social and economic inequality (reviewed in Bracking, 2003; Hansen, 2004 on Somalia; Ghosh, 2006), and given the particular vulnerabilities experienced by remitters themselves (Datta et al., 2006; Akuei, 2005). For instance, some studies find that increasing inflows of remittances may lead to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and cause resources to be allocated from the tradeable to the non-tradeable sector which, in the long run, can hinder economic growth in the recipient countries. This is commonly referred to as the Dutch disease phenomenon. (Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo, 2004; Acosta et al., 2009). Other scholars argue that remittances can induce negative changes in behaviour at household level, which may also reduce their economic impact. This is because a significant portion of the remittances are spent in ‘status-oriented’ and non-productive consumption and other economically unproductive investments (Chami et al., 2003).

Remittances can also have a deleterious impact on growth by reducing labour supply or limiting labour-force participation on national development issues. Chami et al., (2005) show that where such effects are dominant, remittances do have an unfavourably high impact on recipient economies. Interestingly, some scholars argue that remittances’ contribution to development can reduce the incentives to implement sound macroeconomic policies or obviate the need to institute necessary structural reforms (Catrinescu et al., 2009). Abdih et al., (2012) show that remittances affect the incentives faced by governments, and may therefore have significant effects on the quality of local governance.

Their key argument is that access to remittance finance renders government corruption less costly for domestic households to bear, and hence such corruption is likely to increase. Other studies find differential effects of remittances on different regions. For instance, Singh et al., (2009) investigate the determinants of remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and the effects of remittances on growth. Although their findings on the relationship between remittances and growth are mixed, a key finding is that the unfavourable impact of remittances on growth is the largest in the SSA. This is on account of the moral hazard argument, resulting in a reduction of labour supply and consequently, of growth. Some studies have established that the impact of remittances on

economic growth can be enhanced or limited by local conditions in the recipient countries.

These conditions include human capital, institutions and financial markets. Ratha (2003) reports that over the period 1996–2000, remittances averaged 0.5 % of GDP in countries with a corruption index higher than the median level, in comparison to 1.9 % in countries with a level lower than the median. Fajnzylber and Lopez (2007) examine circumstances in which remittances may be beneficial in promoting economic growth by incorporating interaction terms between remittances and variables that may complement remittances in promoting growth. They find that the effect of remittances on economic growth depends on the local conditions prevailing in the recipient countries. Catrinescu et al., (2009), show that remittances are more likely to generate longer-term growth where the quality of political and economic institutions is higher.

Remittances have become an important source of external finance in many developing countries. They can play a developmental role by financing human capital formation, smoothing consumption and increasing household expenditures thereby providing multiplier effects on the economy (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Remittances improve the well-being not only of direct receiver populations but also of those who do not have any relatives abroad. World Bank (2006) finds that remittances are associated with gains in well-being in the receiver countries. The fixed exchange rate regulations, the tight exchange controls and the hyper-inflationary environment in Zimbabwe resulted in formal remittances remaining sluggish throughout the crisis period (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). People in the diaspora preferred sending remittances through informal channels as these paid more than the formal system; and as such the country derived no direct benefits from the transfers. There are also a number of studies that adopt a microeconomic perspective.

According to a World Bank forecast, Sub-Saharan countries will see remittance flows drop by 23.1% to USD37 billion in 2020 in the wake of the Covid-19 economic crisis (Adegoke, 2020). In 2019 it dipped by 0.5% to USD48 billion. Nigeria, which has a sizeable diaspora across the world, is by far the largest recipient of remittance flows with USD23.8 billion in 2019 followed by Ghana (USD3.5 billion) and Kenya (USD2.8 billion). In South Sudan, remittances of USD1.3 billion accounted for 34% of its GDP, the highest in the region (Adegoke, 2020).

**Table 3: Top 10 highest remittance receiving countries in Africa (USD\$ billion), 2019**

1	Nigeria	23,8
2	Ghana	3,5
3	Kenya	2,8
4	Senegal	2,5
5	DRC	1,8
6	Zimbabwe	1,7
7	Uganda	1,3
8	South Sudan	1,3
9	Mali	1,0
10	South Africa	0,9

*Source: World Bank, 2019*

Clearly, migration can help alleviate or reduce poverty. To be sure, there are serious questions about the circumstances under which it can be expected to do so and about the developments and reforms of the financial sector that might be required to facilitate easy repatriation of remittances. But that migration seems to constitute a step away from poverty, if not out of it, is not a tenuous hypothesis. The challenges, however, in demonstrating empirically such a link cannot be overstated. Empirically, establishing causality with available data and moreover understanding whether migration leads to lower poverty levels depends qualitatively on how one defines the inverse relationship between poverty reduction and migration strategies, (Dzingirai, Mutopo and Landau, Crush, Chikanda and Tawodzera 2012). Others flee the country as asylum seekers due to ‘political crimes’ they are said to have committed. According to Masiwa and Doroh (2011) a political refugee is a person who flees from war or political persecution in his/her own country to seek protection in another country. Some political refugees are highly educated and skilled and if granted enough opportunities, can make significant contributions to both their host and home countries. The people of Jewish descent for instance, have made immense contributions throughout the world when they sought political refuge in other countries, fleeing Nazi Germany.

### 1.6.3.3 APPLICABILITY TO THE ZIMBABWEAN CONTEXT.

In Zimbabwe, the World Bank estimates that migrant remittances through official channels amounted to USD17 million in 1980, increasing to USD33 million in 1982, and USD44 million in 1994. Hence, remittances are critical to household well-being in Zimbabwe. Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) purported that remittances bring positive benefits to the country if they are transferred through formal channels and are invested in productive economic activities. However, the authors Zanamwe and Devillard further argued that remittance transfers through informal channels such as *malaitshas* (informal couriers who transport goods and money from South Africa to Zimbabwe) which are used for consumptive purposes have limited economic benefit to the country. Masiwa and Doroh stated that about 72% of Zimbabweans in the diaspora send remittances to relatives and friends back home and this is mostly done through informal channels. The recipients of the remittances use the money for food (41%), education (12%), rentals (10%), health (7%), and clothing (7%). About 30% of the respondents said that they had made significant investments in Zimbabwe since they left. The most preferred investment areas are immovable property, motor and transport, agriculture and mining.

Formal remittance transfers to Zimbabwe over the past decade have been affected by several changes in the policy and regulatory environment (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Furthermore, Zimbabweans in the diaspora preferred to use informal remittance channels as they were more rewarding than the formal system; as such the country derived no direct benefits from remittance transfers during this period (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). It should be noted that the Zimbabwean diaspora is a heterogeneous group comprising different categories of people. The categories include refugees, asylum seekers, failed asylum seekers, resident permit holders, work permit holders, students and illegal immigrants. Although Zimbabweans in the diaspora remit money to relatives back home, little has been done to invest in their country, which desperately needs investment capital to create more employment opportunities and economic growth (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011).

Permitting them to work would provide more income and skills development opportunities that would benefit Zimbabwe in the medium to long term (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Formal remittance transfers to Zimbabwe over the past decade have been affected by several changes

in the policy and regulatory environment (Masiwa and Doroh. 2011). Viable investment opportunities potentially exist in virtually all sectors of the economy, that is, mining and minerals beneficiation, agriculture and agricultural processing, infrastructure, immovable property, Information and Communication Technology (ICT), education, health, social welfare, equities and money market, hotel and tourism, construction, textiles and clothing, finance and insurance. This is more so in view of the fact that Zimbabwe has experienced serious economic crisis in the last two decades and any meaningful recovery is likely to lead to high investment returns.

#### ***1.6.4 Improving living and working conditions***

Migration has a positive effect of improving living and working conditions for many people. Poverty, or the threat of it, generally forces people to leave. Many people look for employment opportunities elsewhere in order to enhance their living conditions at home. Paying jobs allow them to sustain their families and provide for their daily needs. McGregor (2012) states that the economic dimensions of the crisis meant that the new diaspora developed a central economic role, for, as the Zimbabwean economy nosedived, remittances became essential to the survival of those left behind. According to Masiwa and Doroh (2011) China, Israel, South Korea and India have all efficaciously harnessed their diaspora for development purposes. In the case of the USA, immigrants came to work and build a better life for themselves and their families. America's historical openness to immigration has enriched its culture, expanded economic opportunity, and enhanced its influence in the world (Griswold, 2018).

#### ***1.6.5 Family resources***

Migration has to do with the accumulation of family resources. Masiwa and Doroh (2011) are of the view that households with at least one emigrant are better off than those who have no one. Remittances, be they in cash or material resources are an important contribution to family resources. Infrastructure related challenges in Zimbabwe, particularly the inconsistent electricity and water supply and high utility bills were given are factors that deter people from investing in Zimbabwe. The majority of Zimbabweans in the diaspora have invested in immovable properties such as houses, commercial properties and vacant stands. Such investment usually directly benefits the families, not the country. People are unwilling to invest in government projects, especially where there is corruption and

lack of transparency. Many countries have established reputable investment schemes for people in the diaspora. The Philippines, Egypt, and Moldova have programs that allow migrants to buy land at preferential prices (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). In Sudan, the Land for Emigrants Program provides quick foreign exchange for building plots in the Khartoum area at preferential rates. Pakistan offers a non-repatriable investment scheme and business set-up advisory services for migrants.

In addition, remittances generate positive multiplier effects, since recipient households increase their consumption of local goods and services, thus encouraging production and employment in local industry (World Bank, 2003). In the year 2007 the Latin American and Caribbean countries took the lead receiving over USD60 billion, followed by East Asia and the Pacific with about USD59 billion and Europe and Central Asia with more than USD47 billion of remittances (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa remitted the least with only about USD12 billion received, and remittances of only 48% were made through formal channels in this region compared to 75 % in Europe and Central Asia, 61% in East Asia and the Pacific and 63% in Latin America and the Caribbean (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Most of the remittances in Sub-Saharan Africa are for consumption and social security purposes. Remittances will be discussed in-depth later.

### ***1.6.6 Education***

People also leave their home countries for educational purposes. Zanamwe and Devillard, (2009) purport that the migration of nationals offers opportunities that might benefit not only migrants and their families, but also society at large. Others migrate temporarily or permanent for post-graduate studies. A case in point is that of Zimbabweans studying in Namibia, China, Russia, South Africa, UK, Australia, USA, Turkey, Cyprus, etc. While some return back home, it is believed that a significant number do not do so due to unfavourable economic situation in Zimbabwe. More studies need to be done determine the proportion of Zimbabwean students in the diaspora who decide not to return home, causes thereto and what government can to incentivise the students to come back home and use their newly acquired skills to develop their country.

### ***1.6.7 Export of goods and services***

According to Meagher (2003) the strangulation of popular livelihoods in the context of rising unemployment and nose-diving incomes has encouraged participation in trans-border activities as a means of income generation. Many of the continent's official borders and unofficial crossing points are hives of activity as commodities flow in both directions to ensure the survival of communities that live across them (Pophiwa, 2018). The COMESA and SADC arrangements, by enabling income generation, help preserve lives and sustain families in Zimbabwe in the face of its current challenges (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). The COMESA treaty guarantees free movement of goods and services wholly produced within member states. It allows free entry by traders from member states, and waives custom duties on products produced in member countries.

Under the COMESA treaty, Zimbabwean citizens may enter Malawi or Zambia and engage in cross-border trade and entrepreneurship without the burden of taxes (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Some countries are exporters of manufactured goods that come through their international sea ports, while their neighbours supply them with agricultural produce (Pophiwa, 2018). Because all three countries have ratified the SADC Protocol on Free Trade, which offers similar advantages to those of the COMESA treaty, few tariffs and non-tariff barriers apply to Zimbabwean traders in Botswana or Mozambique either. This has encouraged circular migration. According to Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) circular migration is the movement of people across the borders of a neighbouring country for a period of less than one day.

As the economy declined and most basic goods became scarce, Zimbabwe witnessed growth in the number of day-trippers to neighbouring countries, for the purposes of shopping. Of all the border posts, Beitbridge experiences the highest volume of day-trippers into South Africa, followed by the Plumtree border into Botswana and the Nyamapanda border into Mozambique (Zimano, Chimanikire and Chilunjika 2019; Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). These arrangements promote and improve business opportunities and profits in the countries concerned, and by facilitating income generation also help preserve lives and sustain families in Zimbabwe in the face of its current challenges. Most day-trippers are not required to have official travel documents for crossing borders, as they are given gate passes which are stamped at the border (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009).



## **1.7 Negative effects of migration on Zimbabwe**

### **1.7.1 Brain Drain**

A negative impact associated with emigration is that it promotes the brain drain i.e. the migration of relatively highly educated individuals from developing to developed countries. At the moment Zimbabwe faces a number of migration challenges such as the brain drain (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). One of the major achievements by the Zimbabwean government since 1980 was the provision of education to its people. However, a considerable number of them have since migrated to other countries in the last decade due to Zimbabwe's political and economic problems (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011).

Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) state that the country has gradually shifted from being a migrant-receiving country to being predominantly a transit and migrant-sending country. The migrations have had a negative impact on the country's economy. As such, development of the receiving country appreciates more than the country of supply. This partially explains the increased development of developed economies and the underdevelopment of developing economies. Furthermore, when many skilled workers leave the host country it paints a negative picture of their home country.

#### **1.7.1.1. LOSS OF HUMAN CAPITAL**

Hossain (2016) cited Bontis et al, (1999) who defined human capital as 'the human factor in the organization; the combined intelligence, skills and expertise that gives the organization its distinctive character'. A country that loses individuals with high skill experiences a loss (Rosenzweig, 2005). Zimbabwe, like other Sub Saharan countries faces the problem of building and strengthening capacities as well as maintaining and effectively utilising them, as they continue to suffer unprecedented loss of human capital needed for growth to the industrialised world (Chimboza, 2012). Zimbabweans continue to leave the country because of dissatisfaction with the country's political, economic and social situation. Emigration from a country affects its aggregate income by affecting the skill price and the level of skill (Rosenzweig, 2005). The more skilled are the out-migrants the greater the amount of aggregate skill reduction and thus the larger the upward effect on the skill price.

The exodus of skilled human capital, a vital component of economic

growth, has negatively affected Zimbabwe. A 2009 assessment report on Public Finance Management (PFM) system for the Zimbabwe government stated that Zimbabwe had experienced an unprecedented brain drain such that the remaining skills base was not adequate to carry out the responsibilities expected of them in the new order being formulated. The migration of highly educated and skilled workers has had adverse economic, social, and cultural implications. The loss of these skilled professionals necessary for planning, innovation and delivery of services is a big blow to the already bleeding economy. There is general consensus that between a third and half of the developing world's educated and skilled now live in the developing world (Chimboza, 2012).

#### **1.7.1.2. SKILLS FLIGHT**

Closely related to brain drain is skills flight. Currently, Zimbabwe's informal economy is [the largest in Africa](#) and second only to Bolivia in the world. The informal sector accounts for at least 60% of all economic activity in the country. Over the past two decades most professionals have migrated to the USA, UK, Canada and Australia. This skills outflow had been expected (Chimboza, 2012). Zimbabwe has also been provoked by inimitable migration challenges, including, but not limited to, irregular migration, and human trafficking and smuggling (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Breadwinners, and sometimes entire families, have migrated to across borders in search of better employment opportunities. Skill areas affected include, but are not limited to medicine, education, engineering, surveying, architecture, audiology, veterinary medicine and forensic science (Muqayi and Manyeruke, 2019). The education and health sectors typify the extent and effect of brain drain in the economic sectors. The loss of skills is of growing concern as it has negatively impacted on service delivery.

Health worker migration presents a daunting challenge to health systems in many Sub-Saharan African countries (Chikanda and Dodson, 2015). The brain drain of health professionals from Zimbabwe has had a crippling effect on the country's public health system. In 2008, 65% of health care services were provided by the public sector. Loss of public health professionals and researchers in Zimbabwe also suffocates innovation and invention in finding solutions to the population's health problems (Chimboza, 2012). The severe social and economic challenges since that time have resulted in an unprecedented deterioration of health care infrastructure, loss of

experienced health sector personnel, and a drastic decline in the quality of health services available for the population (Human Resources for Health Profile, 2009). The public health sector in particular has suffered inordinately, in part because doctors and nurses have been undervalued by the Government through poor remuneration and severe deterioration of their working conditions. As a result, many of them migrated to seek better job prospects in other countries (Chikanda, 2010). In the few cases that the professionals returned home, they sought employment in the private sector, where conditions are much better. So, on the one hand, Zimbabwe has relatively highly qualified health professionals in the private sector that serves the rich and a poorly-resourced public sector where the poor are condemned to die.

SIRDC (2003), cited by Chimboza (2012), reported that over 80% of Zimbabwe's doctors, nurses, pharmacists and other therapists had left the country since 1980 and that by 2003, the country had lost 2,100 doctors and 1,950 certified nurses to neighboring countries and to the UK, Australia and USA. The poor salaries paid to local professionals compared to those in developed countries have hastened the exodus. By 2000, Zimbabwe had become a leading source country for health professionals, with 51% of locally-trained doctors and 25% of locally-trained nurses practicing abroad. The growing migration of nurses has had a particularly negative impact on primary patient care. Nurses form the backbone of any health service delivery and their out-migration exacerbates the primary health care crisis in sending countries like Zimbabwe. According to Chikanda (2010) nurse migration has left most of Zimbabwe's health institutions with a skeleton staff struggling to cope with increased workloads and growing demands on their expertise.

One consequence of brain drain in Zimbabwe is that it has lost critical human capital, mainly due to bad governance, lack of respect for health professionals and lack of forward planning (Chimboza, 2012). Zimbabwe suffered a net loss because it funds the education and training of professionals who, precisely at the moment they should have become productive, decided to emigrate. Zimbabwe had one of the highest literacy levels on the continent of Africa. The political situation in Zimbabwe resulted in erosion of the quality of education, training, research and development activities in the country, as teachers, college professors and other educators left the country, leaving most educational institutions

operating with less than half of required staff and faculty (Chimboza, 2012). The migration of teachers from Zimbabwe has impacted negatively on the quality of education provided at primary, secondary and tertiary levels. South Africa is one of the countries to which many Zimbabweans have migrated in search of greener pastures. The scale of emigration has led a United Nations Development Programme funded research team to conclude that education remains one of the sectors hardest hit by the labour out-migration.<sup>1</sup>

### **1.7.2 Dysfunctional families**

Parents often leave their children behind when they migrate for several reasons. The rapid collapse in formal employment opportunities in Zimbabwe combined with political violence was such that many parents felt that they had no option but to seek better opportunities abroad for their family's and particularly their children's well-being (Kufakurinani, Pasura and McGregor, 2014). Prolonged enforced separation from children has been a major cause of distress for those caught for long periods in irregular status, or in dysfunctional asylum systems (Kufakurinani et al., 2014). Migration, in some instances, perpetuated the breakdown of the 'extended' family values sustained and represented by visiting one another, caring for and being with each other in troubled as well as good times (Kufakurinani, 2013). Migration has led to long distance or remote parenting.

## **2.1 Humanitarian assistance**

Migration has long been a means for households to seek work, improve livelihoods and raise their incomes, as well as to escape extreme situations of persecution, conflict and hunger (Dzingirai et al., 2015). Pophiwa (2018) cited Hungwe (2013), Beremauro (2013) and Siziba (2013), who pointed-out to high poverty levels among Zimbabwean migrants in cities such as Johannesburg and where humanitarian intervention is necessary e.g. through the provision of free ART.

## **2.2 Foreign Direct Investment and Corporate Governance**

Migration is not a separate activity; immigrants may stimulate international trade and remove bilateral investment barriers. They can be significant players in international market/trade information and investment (Gheasi, Nijkamp and Rietveld, 2011). Gheasi et.al, (2011) observed that increased

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1 'Education Sector Grapples With Brain Drain', *The Herald*, 4 November, 2019.

immigrants from a particular country may be accompanied by an increase in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Whilst it is acknowledged for a fact that the diaspora makes a substantial contribution to remittances, it is however, not clear whether enough is invested in the home country to stimulate economic growth and create employment (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Besides, the Zimbabwean diaspora are not involved in any systematic or important trade, mainly due to lack of regulatory and institutional frameworks. The Migration and Development Unit (MDU) in the Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion was established by government in April 2008 in order to improve the co-ordination of migration and diaspora activities.

The Unit works closely with the IOM which has also provided the office, equipment, stationery and a vehicle as part of its capacity building (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). It spearheads the national migration and development agenda on a daily basis. The ministry responsible has also formulated a Migration Management and diaspora Policy, with technical assistance from IOM. The volatile economic situation in Zimbabwe discouraged the diaspora from carrying out any trade activities. The further impediments to trade were given as the lack of adequate capital to procure high volumes of tradeable goods that can be sold at a profit. The socio-political situation in Zimbabwe also poses a major challenge related to political uncertainty, exclusion from the socio-political processes, limited channels of investment/trade, inadequate market related information and limited institutions dealing with diaspora issues.

### **2.3 Investment, trade policy, tax policy**

Throughout the world, the diaspora plays an important role in the development of the home countries' economies through skills and technology transfers, investments, trade as well as the creation of social and professional networks that advance the countries' developmental needs. Most Zimbabweans in the diaspora are investing and trading in their home country. However, there are limited institutions that deal with diaspora Investment and Trade. Zimbabwe lacks institutions specifically dedicated to facilitate diaspora investment and trade. This is an area where business opportunities exist for local institutions and assurances are needed to ensure that people do not fall prey to fraudulent institutions (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). Government may help by legislating measures to protect people from such institutions. Moreover, Zimbabwean diaspora are keen to know

on the country's economic performance and the sectors doing well to make investment decisions. The diaspora is therefore concerned about the poor access to investment and trade related information (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). They rely mostly on the international media, which in most cases portrays Zimbabwe negatively and as a result, are afraid of returning home or even invest there. Although alternative sources of information like the internet are available, there are few websites offering specific investment and trade related information.

According to Masiwa and Doroh (2011) the Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA), Zimbabwe National Chamber of Commerce (ZNCC) and Confederation of Zimbabwe Industries (CZI) are some of the institutions that are supposed to provide such information. Providing technical capacity to these institutions would certainly improve their ability to provide well analysed investment and trade related information on the internet and in other media. A stable economic situation is a pre-requisite for investment. The macroeconomic environment needs to improve first before people in the diaspora can feel confident to invest in Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe, the World Bank (2008) estimates that migrant remittances through official channels amounted to USD17 million in 1980, increasing to USD33 million in 1982, and USD44 million in 1994. It is estimated that more remittances are sent through informal channels. Zimbabwe stands to benefit from instituting policies that encourage the transmission of remittances through formal means.

### **3.1 Harnessing the positive impacts**

#### **3.1.1 Policy framework**

There are a number of government ministries and co-ordination mechanisms dealing with migration and diaspora issues. The ministries involved include the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Services, Ministry Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education, Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education, Science and Technology Development, Ministry of Regional Integration and International Cooperation, Ministry of Higher and Tertiary Education and the Ministry of Youth Development, Indigenisation and Empowerment. In order to capitalise on the potential benefits of migration, the Government of Zimbabwe has incentivised the process through specific policy initiatives, some of which are outlined below.

### **3.1.1.1 NATIONAL DIASPORA POLICY**

Zimbabwe developed the National Diaspora Policy with the United Nations Migration Agency Support. The main themes are capacity building, migration and development. Zimbabwe has convened a high level discussion to develop the country's 2017-2022 National Diaspora Policy Implementation Action Plan with support from IOM, the UN Migration Agency and the European Union. The plan serves as a framework for engaging with the Zimbabwean diaspora worldwide. Eighty participants took part from government ministries, the UN and the private sector, as well as diaspora representatives and other non-state actors. The operationalisation of the 2016 adopted National Diaspora Policy through a well-defined action plan comes against a background of increasing government acknowledgment of the potential of the Zimbabwean diaspora in contributing towards national development. The action plan comprises of eight priority areas that relate to policies and legislation, the intra-governmental-diaspora relationship, institutional engagement, diaspora relationship, institutional engagement, diaspora investment, remittances, national socio-economic development, knowing the diaspora and diaspora's rights.

The government recognises that beyond remittances from abroad, our diaspora presents social, economic, intellectual and political capital, a pool of knowledge and expertise which must be harnessed for the benefit of the country. The Government of Zimbabwe has demonstrated commitment to creating institutional structures that promote diaspora engagement in the national development agenda. The adoption of the National Diaspora Policy in July 2016 and the establishment and launch of the Diaspora Directorate in September 2016 are testimony of such commitment. In addition, with support from IOM and the EU, the Government of Zimbabwe conducted in October 2016 initial Zimbabwean Diaspora Engagement meetings in the UK, Canada and SA to move towards building mutual trust between the government and members of the Zimbabwean diaspora. The following countries have created government ministries and departments that deal specifically with diaspora issues: Ethiopia, Burkina Faso, Tunisia, Mali, Ghana, Benin, Senegal, America, Chile, Brazil, Syria, France, Australia, Italy, Turkey, Peru and Azerbaijan (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). These authorities are responsible for the welfare of people living in the diaspora ensuring their participation in political and socio-economic activities back home (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011).

### **3.1.1.2 NATIONAL LABOUR MIGRATION POLICY**

The National Labour Migration Policy was formulated to make it easier for lower skilled people to seek work abroad and offer them social protection, while at the same time strengthening mechanisms for harnessing remittances for economic development. The government indicated its commitment to a development and implementation of the Labour Migration Policy that aims to manage the country's internal, intra-regional and international migration flows. Through this policy, the government seeks to maximise the benefits of inward and outward labour migration for national development, including through remittances and investment promotion and functional labour market information systems. The vision of the National Labour Migration Policy is to establish a sustainable and inclusive labour migration management system that promotes good governance and effective regulation of labour migration and protects the rights of labour migrants and their families.

The policy also seeks to protect the welfare of thousands of Zimbabweans living abroad and implement strategies to deal with the challenges posed by migration of all forms. Migration is increasingly being recognised as a major human development issue, which, if effectively managed, could contribute towards socio-economic development. For Zimbabwe, between 2009 and June 2015, international remittances have scored second after exports in terms of foreign currency earnings. According to the 2017 National Budget Statement, formal remittance receipts amounted to USD935 million in 2015 and USD780 million in 2016. The National Labour Migration Policy accordingly seeks to compliment other existing frameworks such as the National Diaspora Policy and Trafficking in Persons National Plan of Action in order to harness the development gains from labour migration while extending protection to the citizens in other countries.

### **3.1.1.3 NATIONAL IMMIGRATION POLICY**

Immigration in Zimbabwe is mainly governed by the Immigration Act (adopted in 1979 and last amended in 2001), whose content is further specified by the Immigration Regulations (adopted in 1998 and last amended in 2005). In principle, any foreigner who intends to stay in Zimbabwe for a period longer than twelve months must possess a temporary permit or residence permit (article 15, Immigration Regulation). The first application for a permit has to be made before entry to the national territory. General rules applicable regardless of the immigration category include the payment



of a fee and the absence of grounds for exclusion as a ‘prohibited person’ (article 15, Immigration Regulation). Categories of exclusion notably include the following grounds: economic grounds (being likely to become a public charge), infectious disease, past criminal conviction, national security (implicit ground), prior violation of immigration legislation, and prostitution (article 14, Immigration Act). The admission of a foreigner for employment is in principle submitted on the condition that the prospective employer can demonstrate to the Foreign Recruitment Committee that no suitable candidate is available locally.

The migrant worker is granted a temporary employment permit for a maximum period of five years, including any period of renewal (article 22 (2) and (4), Immigration Regulations). In principle, the holder of a temporary employment permit is not allowed to change occupations or employers during the period specified in the permit (article 23 (1), Immigration Regulations). It must be noted that the Immigration Regulations foresee the possibility for the spouse and children to join the holder of a temporary employment permit (article 22 (2), Immigration Regulations). The stay of foreign students in Zimbabwe depends upon the issuance of a student permit. Such a permit is normally issued for a period not exceeding one year and may be renewed. Foreign students are not entitled to exercise a professional activity (article 32, Immigration Regulations).

Permanent resident status is normally granted after five years of regular stay in the country (article 17 (a), Immigration Regulations). However, the Immigration Regulations give special consideration to foreigners who invest substantial sums of money in projects approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Centre: a permanent residence permit can be delivered upon admission to foreigners who have transferred USD 1 million or more for the purpose of investment. A three-year residence permit may be granted to foreigners who invest USD300,000 or more. Such a permit may be converted to a permanent residence permit on its expiration (article 17 (a), Immigration Regulations). Alongside the aforementioned temporary and permanent immigrant status, immigration legislation foresees the granting of visitor’s entry certificate for a maximum period of either six or twelve months (article 9 (5), Immigration Regulations). In principle, holders of a visitor’s entry certificate are not authorised to engage in employment (article 42 (2), Immigration Regulations).

The Immigration Act and Immigration Regulations rule departures from the country in great detail. Five separate sections of the Immigration Act are devoted to the process of examining and permitting departures. Regular departure mainly depends on two conditions: the production of a travel document and effecting the departure through a mandated port of exit (articles 24 and 26, Immigration Act). Moreover, for the purpose of migration data collection, the Immigration Regulations require that every person leaving the country complete an exit card and deliver it to the immigration officer (Article 64 (2), Immigration Regulations). The Immigration Act also considers the issue of fraudulent travel documents, and more generally foresees penalties for violations of its provisions that may include a fine and/or imprisonment for a maximum of six months or one year, depending on the offence.

### **3.2 Regional and International Policy Frameworks**

Migration legal regimes and migration management policies operate at two different levels: international and national. At the international level, a further distinction can be made between universal instruments protecting migrants' rights, regional instruments and mechanisms organising a co-operation framework between African and, more specifically, southern African countries, and bilateral agreements concluded by Zimbabwe for the regulation of migration flows (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). The international framework protecting migrants is found in essentially two places, namely international human rights law and specific instruments protecting migrant workers – specific International Labour Organisation (ILO) instruments (Convention Nos. 97 and 143) and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. International human rights instruments can be classified into two distinct groups. General instruments, included in the International Bill of Rights, contain the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). International human rights instruments identified above protect all human beings regardless of their nationality (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). Therefore, migrants, as non-nationals, are generally entitled to the same human rights as citizens.

Africa is one of the first continents to have developed a legal regime of migration. In a bid to address the challenges faced by large numbers of African refugees who were fleeing from conflicts resulting from anti-colonial struggles, the then Organisation of African Unity now the African Union (AU) promulgated a regional convention on refugees. The 1969 OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa was the first regional refugee convention in the world and the only relevant binding instrument in the developing world (Zanamwe and Devillard, 2009). The migration policy framework recognises that migration policy is the major topic in the twentieth century. The framework articulates the AU's position on migration which is that well managed migration has the potential to yield significant benefits to origin and destination countries. The IGAD,<sup>2</sup> a block of countries in the whole of Africa, the Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes Region has developed a regional migration policy framework just as other regional groupings. The policy seeks to manage the countries' internal, intra-regional and international migration for national development. The policy also seeks to protect the welfare of thousands of Zimbabweans living abroad and implement strategies to deal with the challenges posed by migration of all forms.

### ***3.2.1 Political Participation***

Every investor in the world considers the political situation in a country before investing and Zimbabweans in the diaspora are not an exception. The diaspora should not only be expected to invest in Zimbabwe but should also be allowed to freely participate in the political processes in the country. Granting them dual citizenship and voters' rights would help address some of their major concerns at present. Experiences in other countries (Brazil, the Philippines, Mexico, Peru, Jamaica, Egypt, Nigeria, Ghana, Burundi, India and Senegal) have shown that allowing dual citizenship improves the level of participation of the diaspora in investment. To enable the full and free participation of the diaspora in politics, the necessary infrastructure should be put in place. This includes developing an interactive parliamentary website where the diaspora can freely express its views and giving capacities to Zimbabwean embassies in the diaspora so that they can handle the diaspora's votes. There have been efforts to formalise the

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2 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development is an eight-country trade bloc in Africa. It includes governments from the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley and the African Great Lakes. Its headquarters are in Djibouti City.

participation of the diaspora in the political processes in Zimbabwe by the various government departments such Ministry of Economic Planning and Investment Promotion.

Zimbabwean in diaspora just like investors want political stability in Zimbabwe where all people are free to express their political opinions without fear and where credible, free and fair elections have been held (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). The encouragement of people to freely participate in the political processes at home would stimulate the investment. The government should stabilise the political environment. This has not been the case in the past two decades and a considerable number of Zimbabweans went into exile to escape political prosecution. Currently, the political situation in Zimbabwe is uncertain. The formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in 2008 initially created optimism that the political situation would stabilise and in response to this, some sent private capital home in anticipation of an improved economic situation (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011). However, the initial hope evaporated as the GNU has proved to be shaky. The government and other developmental organisations should put in place a platform for people in the diaspora to be involved in national political debates, as well as national economic planning strategic policy formulation (Masiwa and Doroh, 2011).

The process of organising free and fair elections facilitated by SADC should continue and should culminate in the establishment of a widely-accepted, democratic government. This would allow the diaspora to feel more secure, and keen to participate without any fear of victimisation. The level of political polarisation is still high as evidenced by the ever-recurring political squabbles and impasses among the different parties. Therefore, the diaspora is still not convinced to increase their investments. A few respondents expressed fear for their safety should they decide to return to Zimbabwe. Such fears, according to them can be allayed by the holding of free and fair elections whose results will not be contested by the major political parties. Zimbabweans in the diaspora also want to exercise their voting rights.

### ***3.2.3 Institutional Framework***

The availability of various permits allowing legal entry eases pressure on the migration system. These permits include: 90-day visitors' permits for SADC citizens in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana; one-day, 50km border passes in Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana; COMESA

permits in Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia (Kiwanuka and Monson, 2009). Zanamwe and Devillard (2009) is of the view that the capacity of the government to minimise the negative consequences of migration while maximising its positive effects is constrained by the lack of a comprehensive and coherent legal, institutional and policy framework for implementing migration processes in an integrated manner. Zanamwe and Devillard further states that the limitations are exacerbated by the lack of adequate data and analysis that highlights the factors driving migration. In light of these problems, a Draft National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy has been developed, and IOM has supported the Zimbabwean government and other stakeholders in the establishment of the Zimbabwe Migration Profile, a repository of migration information for Zimbabwe.

### ***3.2.4 Bilateral Agreements***

Bilateral labour arrangements (BLAs) can be defined broadly as all forms of arrangements between States, regions and public institutions that provide for the recruitment and employment of short- or long-term foreign labour. This broad definition goes beyond the classical binding intergovernmental bilateral agreements and includes also non-legal arrangements, such as Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), as well as ‘non-governmental’ agreements, for example, the arrangements between national employment agencies. BLAs are usually concluded for three reasons: a) economic reasons, in order to organise a match between supply and demand for labour; b) political reasons, in order to promote friendly relations amongst states by encouraging the orderly movement of labour; and c) development reasons, in order to prevent the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon.

There is great variety of BLAs, including the following: BLAs as recruitment schemes (seasonal workers’ schemes, contract workers and project-tied workers agreements, trainee agreements, and working holidays agreements); bilateral agreements facilitating or addressing the consequences of mobility (agreements designed to control/prevent irregular migration, visa facilitation agreements, mutual recognition agreements (recognition of diplomas, right to practice a profession, etc.), social security and double taxation agreements). Zimbabwe has concluded very few BLAs. In the 2000s, the country had an agreement with Cuba for the recruitment of Cuban health professionals in order to limit the negative consequence of the emigration of national health professionals (Chikanda, 2005: 28).

This agreement apparently is yet to be implemented. At present, the only applicable BLA appears to be the recent agreement concluded with South Africa for the facilitation of recruitment for commercial farms in Limpopo Province in South Africa. However, the Draft National Migration Management and Diaspora Policy gives a central role to BLAs in national migration management. In the draft policy document, BLAs are considered as a major policy objective in order to reduce irregular migration and irregular cross-border movements in neighbouring countries; protect the rights and interests of Zimbabwean migrants and cross border traders, including the issue of portability of social benefits and the specific vulnerability of women migrants; and reduce migrants' vulnerability to HIV infection (Republic of Zimbabwe, 2009a).

### ***3.2.5 International Co-operation***

The international framework protecting migrants is found in essentially two places, namely international human rights law and specific instruments protecting migrant workers – ILO instruments (Convention Nos 97 and 143) and the International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their families. International co-operation on migration includes 23 objectives covering the full migration cycle ranging from conditions and drivers of migration in home countries, to preparations for migration, movements, border management and integration in destination countries to development impacts, return and reintegration. Each of these objectives includes a series of concrete actions member states can take. In 2018, the Secretary General established the UN Network on Migration, comprising 38 UN systems entities to ensure coordinated support to Member States.

## **4.1 Conclusion**

Migration has a crucial impact on economic growth. The economy is affected both negatively and positively by the different forms of migrations. As such it is imperative that policies be crafted and enacted to help in harnessing the favourable benefits of migration whilst minimising the adverse and undesirable effects of the same. Over and above, migration is not an entirely negative; it has a number of desirable positives especially if the government puts in place some robust and favourable migration policies that will attract the diasporans to have a sense of belonging which will subsequently enable them to make channel remittances back home. Opinions from the diaspora should always be sought whenever issues of

importance are debated in Parliament. These policies on migration should also help engender confidence among the people who would have crossed the borders to meaningful contribute towards economic development back home. In light of this, there is need for the formalisation of the remittances so that the gains are directly received by their relatives with the state equally benefiting through taxes. Additionally, the people in the diaspora should be allowed to vote, this engenders a sense of inclusivity and belonging such that they are inclined more to make some meaningful investments and send remittances home or even to support some national programmes. The government should also engage the diasporans and make them participate in the preliminary policy making processes so that they have a sense of belonging. The diasporans should not be alienated from the local and national developmental processes.

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